The Sandinistan Revolution in Nicaragua by Hilaly, Kausar Jamil
THE SA^^DI^ IISTAN REVOLUTION 
IN NICARAGUA 
DISSERTATION SUBMITTED 
FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 




KAUSAR ^AMIfe HlbAbY 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 





Dr. B. RAHAMATHULLA DBPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Reader ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH 
This i s to certify that Mr. Kausar Jamil Hilaly 
is a bona fide research student in the Department of 
Political Science, A.M.U., Aligarh. He has written 
a dissertation entitled "The Sandinistan Revolution 
in Nicaragua" under my supervision and guidance. This 
work is original and I believe it is suitable for the 






ROLE OF IDEOLOGY,CHURCH AND 
PRESS IN THE REVOLOTION 
Chapter III INSURRECTION: BEGINNING AND 




SUPER POWER INVOLVEMENT ; 











A land bridge between North and South America and a 
narrow isthmus separating the Atlantic from the Pacific 
Ocean, Central America Has been at economic and cultural 
crossroads and a battleground for foreign powers through-
out its history. The line of volcanoes dotting its 
Pacific mountain chains and periodic earthquakes seem to 
mirror the unsettled nature of the land. In fact, the 
enduring allure of the region derives from its unique 
geographical position. Spain, later France and Britain, and 
finally the United States have all come to appreciate its 
strategic importance for both North and South America. 
However, military intervention and political interference 
by these nations in this area over the years has made 
anti-imperialism a rallying point for revolutionary movements. 
Nicaragua is an excellent case in point. 
Ever since William Walker's invasion in 1885, this 
country has seen repeated American attempts at influencing 
its politics. Starting off with the first direct military 
intervention in 1909, US military presence has remained 
here in varying degrees. The justifications put forward 
for intervention have also varied: from the need to help 
the Liberals in their fight against the Conseirvatives and 
vice versa, to the need to contain communism, and, finally, 
to the need to prop up a pro-American ,corrupt and brutal 
Somoza regime. And in this, Nicaraguan national interests 
and aspirations have been ridden roughshod over. 
The effect of this on Nicaragua has been telling. Although 
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there was, in general, a recognition of the fact that US 
presence was unwarranted and undesirable for Nicaragua, it 
was left to a nationalist, August Cesar Sandino, and his 
small band of followers to go about educating the masses 
and enlisting their support for a movement aimed at 
physically driving the Americans and the Somozas out of 
,the country. Sandino also gave shape to a philosophy 
reconciling major tenets of Christianity with his own brand 
of socialism in an attempt to mobilise the people. 
Dismissed as a rabble-rouser and an opportunist, Sandino's 
efforts were however rudely cut short by his death at the 
hands of Somoza thugs in 1934. 
The Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN), an 
organisation founded by Carlos Fonseca, Tomas Borge and 
Silvio Mayorga in July 1961 to fight Somoza and his cronies, 
began to reinterpret Sandino's original struggle in the 
light of historic and ideological developments following 
his death. Under them, it is said, the rebellious 
Nicaraguan spirit recovered much of its brilliance. Taking 
advantage of the people's revolutionary initiatives, the 
support of a hitherto apolitical Church and the new-found 
hostility of the Press towards the Somozas, the FSLN was 
finally able to overthrow the Somoza dynasty in July 1979 
after a bloody struggle. 
In Nicaragua, anti-Americanism has often,, during and 
after the struggle, translated itself into pro-Sovietism. 
While Cuba, too, played an important role in galvanising 
support for the revolutionaries, the influence of Marx and 
Engels' teachings on the Sandinistas helped them to 
identify themselves with the socialist bloc. Not surpris-
ingly therefore, Nicaragua was soon to become one of the 
newest areas of superpower confrontation. 
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A modest attempt has been made in this dissertation 
to examine the factors that went into the making of the 
JL979 revolution. It seeks to establish a direct relation-
ship between US hegemonic ambitions and the growth of 
Nicaraguan nationalist sentiment which finally culminated 
in victory for the FSLN. 
Chapter I is primarily an introduction to Nicaragua's 
geography and strategic location. Also discussed in it are 
the country's early history, economy and political 
deve1opmen t. 
In Cl^ apter II, Sandino's eclectic philosophy and its 
impact on the subsequent revolutionary process has been 
explained. Besides, the role played by two major actors, 
the Nicaraguan Church and the press, in ushering in the 
Revolution has been discussed. 
Chapter III is a sequential narration of events lead-
ing to the ultimate ouster of Anastasio Somoza Debayle the 
last of the Somozas, from ^ 3v;er and the triumphant march 
to Managua by the Sandinistas, 
US policy towards Nicaragua over the years has been 
discussed in Chapter IV with special emphasis on the policy 
in the years immediately preceding the 1979 revolution. 
This chapter also deals with Soviet interests and involve-
ment in the country, the constraints faced, and the 
successes achieved by it. 
The concluding chapter is an attempt at analysing the 
reasons behind the failure of the Sandinista Front govern-
ment to consolidate its position after coming to power. 
The growth of the Contra movement and the victory of the 
Violeta Chamorro-led Union of National Opposition (UNO) 
coa l i t i on par ty in the February, 1990 e l ec t i ons have a l so 
been examined in t h i s chapter , to make the d i s s e r t a t i o n 
up- to -da te . 
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The name Nicaragua, which has cropped up ever so 
frequently in the realm of international politics over the 
past decade, conjures, up in the mind of the average 
reader, the image of a strife-torn and ravaged nation for 
apparent reasons. Flanked by a hostile Honduras on the 
north and a not-too-friendly Costa Rica on the south, this 
largest Central American state has been playing unwilling 
and unintending host to a proxy "civil war" fought by the 
two super powers; a war which threatens to tear asunder 
its social, political and economic fabric. 
While to some, the 1979 revolution in the country and 
events following it are a symbol of the determination of a 
people to successfully resist the designs of an imperialist 
power seeking to establish hegemony^to others, it bears 
ominous portents of a communist resurrection and entry into 
the Latin American mainland. However, an objective approach 
would probably incline one towards the view that it is no 
more and no less than an extension of the cold war to South 
America. 
A correct picture of the situation in Nicaragua would, 
however, oe difficult to draw and understand without any 
reference to its strategic importance, primarily' an 
agricultural nation involved in the plantation of cotton, 
1 The word Nicaragua is derived' from the name of a native, 
tribal Indian Chief Nicarao, who lived in this region 
when the Spaniards conquered it in the early 1500s. 
sugar, coffee and banana, Nicaragua is a distant cry from 
the resource-laden colony prospect that generally attracts 
colonial powers. But this factor has been relegated to 
the background in favour of more weighty political consi-
derations, even as the Big Two and their surrogates 
continue their endeavours to gain a foothold in the country 
through both covert and overt means. 
Long considered one of the most stable and durable of 
North America's clientele states in the region under the 
firm domination of Somoza family rule, Nicaragua has 
seemingly become the epicentre of violent revolutionary 
change throughout Central America. Apart from the fact 
that the Sandinistan revolution inspired insurrectionary 
activity in neighbouring countries by example, it has provided 
a safe base for revolutionary organisations in the region to 
prepare or direct other insurrections. In reality, however* 
the social, political and economic forces that helped 
precipitate the Nicaraguan revolution, together with the 
particular array of political actors and behavioural 
propensities within Nicaraguan society that facilitated 
the initiation of mass insurrectionary activity are, in many 
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respects, unique to Nicaragua. This is, however, not to 
suggest that Nicaragua before the revolution had vejry little 
in common with the rest of the Central American republics. 
On the contrary, the country shared literacy and health 
problems, endemic structural unemployment, lack of infra-
structural facilities, skewed income distribution and 
legacy of political turmoil with most of the other Central 
American nations. 
2 Stephen M.Gorman, 'Social Change and Political Revolution', 
in Steve, C.Ropp and James A. Morris (edited), Central 
America ; Crisis and Adaptation, (University of New 
Mexico Press, 1985), p.33. 
GENERAL GEOGRAPHY 
The p a t t e r n of s e t t l e m e n t i n N i c a r a g u a i s t h e f i r s t 
f a c t o r wh ich d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t from t h e r e s t of C e n t r a l 
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A m e r i c a . Whi l e l i k e i t s n e i g h b o u r s , t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y 
of t h e N i c a r a g u a n p o p u l a t i o n l i v e s on t h e P a c i f i c s i d e 
of t h e moun ta in c h a i n t h a t r u n s down t h e m i d d l e of t h e 
C e n t r a l American i s t h m u s , t h e p r i n c i p a l p o p u l a t i o n c e n t r e s 
a r e l o c a t e d a t much l o w e r e l e v a t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e have 
a more t r o p i c a l , l e s s d e s i r a b l e c l i m a t e t h a n i s t r u e f o r 
most of t h e r e g i o n ' s o t h e r m a j o r u r b a n c e n t r e s . G e o g r a -
p h i c a l l y , t h e c o u n t r y i s d i v i d e d begween a l a r g e , u n d e r -
d e v e l o p e d A t l a n t i c o r C a r i b b e a n r e g i o n and a c o n s i d e r a b l y 
more d e v e l o p e d b u t s m a l l e r P a c i f i c r e g i o n . A c h a i n of 
m o u n t a i n s a v e r a g i n g 610 m e t r e s i n e l e v a t i o n r u n n i n g a b o u t 
400 kms from t h e s o u t h - e a s t e r n f r o n t i e r w i t h C o s t a R i c a 
s e p a r a t e s t h e two a r e a s . Ye t a n o t h e r r a n g e of m o u n t a i n s 
r u n s i n t h e n o r t h - e a s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n a l o n g t h e r e m a i n d e r 
of t h e b o r d e r w i t h H o n d u r a s . 
N i c a r a g u a ' s P a c i f i c r e g i o n c o n s i s t s e s s e n t i a l l y of a 
l o w - l y i n g b a s i n c o n t a i n i n g two l a r g e , i s l a n d - d o t t e d l a k e s . 
A nar row r a n g e of v o l c a n i c m o u n t a i n s s e p a r a t e s t h i s b a s i n 
from t h e P a c i f i c . A m a j o r i t y of t h e p o p u l a t i o n h a s 
s e t t l e d w i t h i n t h e c o n f i n e s of t h i s s e m i - t r o p i c a l b a s i n 
o r on t h e h i g h l a n d s of s u r r o u n d i n g m o u n t a i n s . I n r e c e n t 
t i m e s , however , a l o t of s e t t l e m e n t s have s p r u n g up i n t h e 
' r e g i o n i n and a round Managua, t h e c a p i t a l c i t y , l o c a t e d 
g e n e r a l l y , be tween l a k e s Managua and N i c a r a g u a . The 
p o p u l a t i o n of t h i s w e s t e r n r e g i o n of N i c a r a g u a i s a l m o s t 
N i c a r a g u a i s t h e l e a s t d e n s e l y p o p u l a t e d C e n t r a l 
American n a t i o n ; w i t h 2 , 3 7 3 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e f o r i t s 5 0 , 0 0 0 
s q . m i l e s , g i v i n g i t a d e n s i t y of 43 p e r s o n s p e r s q . 
m i l e ( F i g u r e s a r e f o r 1975). 
uniformly Mestizo, and therefore relatively homogenous, 
although a very small minority may be considered blancos, 
or white. The Caribbean region of Nicaragua* on the 
other hand, presents a kaledioscope of ethnic, racial and 
linguistic minorities which together constitute something 
between 5 and 10 per cent of the national population. 
Most notable among these minorities are the Miskitu 
Indians and English-speaking descendants of African 
slaves. 
Inhabitants of this.Caribbean region have seldom, 
almost never, contributed to the political and economic 
life of the country. In fact, throughout Nicaragua's 
history, the area has remained virtually isolated from 
the national mainstream. The distance and cold relations, 
bordering on hostility, between the peoples of eastern and 
western Nicaragua can only partially be e^ qplained in terms 
of ethnic, racial, linguistic and of course, geographical 
differences. One must take into account also the fact 
that these two regions have had totally divergent historical 
experiences. As Philippe Bourgois, who has studied the 
life and culture of Nicaragua's native Indians, explains: 
"The profound cultural antagonism between 
the Pacific and Atlantic provinces of 
Nicaragua arose out of their distinct 
historical experiences, and social forma-
tions. It has its roots in the diametrically 
opposed trajectories of Spanish and British 
Colonialism in the region"6 
Mestizos are persons of mixed Spanish and Indian blood 
found almost all over Latin America. 
Miskitu Indians are the inhabitants of the virtually 
inaccessible Mosquito Coast which runs some 200 miles 
along the northern part of the Caribbean coast. 
Philippe Bourgois, 'The Problematic of Nicaragua's 
Indigenous Minorities', in T. Walker (edited), Nicaragua 
in Revolution (New York:Praeger Pviblishers, 1982) , p.306< 
The Atlantic provinces' tradition of resistance 
to Spanish Colonialism,starting from the 16th century and 
which benefited from British assistance,has carried over 
into modern times in which the minorities have consis-
tently defied the authority of sxibsequent Nicaraguan 
governments. 
The political development of Nicaragua has been 
influenced largely by its geography. The existence of a 
natural pass through the chain of mountains that cuts 
across the length of Central America and the close 
proximity of two large, ,low-level lakes,has, since time 
immemorial, made Nicaragua an ideal location for a trans-
isthmian canal. Recognition of this fact led to early 
British and North American political penetration of the 
country, much earlier and more direct, than in the rest 
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of the region. This development, as was found later, had 
umpteen ramifications for the subsequent evolution of 
political attitudes and orientations among certain groups 
of the Nicaraguan population. Anti-imperialism became an 
inherent part of Nicaraguan thought as an inevitable 
corollary to concrete historical events. Mention must 
also be made of the fact that though Nicaragua charted a 
course of political and especially economic development 
similar in outline to the rest of Central America, it 
lagged somewhat behind its counterparts in many other 
respects, particularly during the years following its 
independence in 1821, The aforementioned facts can be 
best illustrated by a brief revision of Nicaragua's early 
history. 
EARLY HISTORY AND POLITICS 
In pre-Hispanic times, the area that is now Nicaragua, 
was inhabited by a variety of Indian tribes. With the 
advent of Europeans in 1522/ in the shape of a Spanish 
expedition from Panama led by Gil Gonzalez de Avita (1470-
1528), followed by another Spanish expedition led by 
Francisco de Cordoba (1475-1525) in 1524, much of this 
population either died out or was assimilated by the 
conquerors. In fact, according to a 1548 Spanish census, 
only 11,000 Indians were left from a population estimated 
g 
between 5,00,000 and 7,50,000. In 1570, these pioneer 
settlements were joined to the Spanish colony of 
Guatemala. In the 1600s, English sea-raiders attacked 
both the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Nicaragua and 
managed to establish their influence over the Indians of 
the Mosquito Coast. The Mosquito Coast was declared a 
British protectorate in 1587 and it remained so until the 
1780s. 
The three cen tur ies of co lon ia l r u l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y by 
the Spanish, l e f t deep scars on Nicaraguan thought, economy 
and p o l i t y . Having destroyed the loca l labour force, the 
Spanish inexplicably l o s t i n t e r e s t in the area . The 
colonisers who remained^had to r e s to re some Indian r i g h t s , 
including l imited self-government and communal landholdings 
ca l led e j idos , and a system based on. large ranches and 
grain-growing e s t a t e s surrounded by s a t e l l i t e Indian 
hamlets engaged in sxobsistence ag r i cu l t u r e developed. The 
Indians paid t r i b u t e from t h e i r crops besides providing 
workers for the e s t a t e s . This bas ic pa t t e rn prevai led 
u n t i l the s t a r t of large scale coffee production for 
export in the mid-nineteenth century . The grea t landowners 
7 World Book Encyclopaedia, N-0, vo l . 13, (Chicago: 
1960) , p . 316. 
8 Robert S. Leiken and Barry Rvibin (edited) , Central 
American Cr i s i s Reader, (Summit Books, 1987) , 
p . 38. 
extended their holdings at the expense of the ejidos and 
peasant plots. Those who lost their land became dependent 
upon the large estates or had to migrate to the cities. 
The Spanish conquerors thus left for the Indians a 
legacy of a semi-feudal economic system based on exploitar 
tation and the corresponding attribute in the political 
system, viz., authoritarianism. These patterns, have 
'persisted from generation to generation into our day, 
reinforced by the Church and the educational system with 
wealth, education and political power continuing to be 
shared unequally between the descendants of the conquerors 
and those of the conquered. 
When independence from Spanish rule came in 1821, 
Central America was under the loose administrative 
authority of Mexico City. The region became independent 
as the united provinces of Central America with its capital 
in Guatemala in 1823; Nicaragua being one of its five 
constituent units. Since its inception, however, the 
confederation was beset with internal bickering, the axis 
of political competition being between the liberals, with 
their anticlericalism and desire for a federalist system, 
and conservativfes, who favoured state support of church 
privileges and a strong Central government. The titles of 
these two political parties, which have subsequently come 
to play a major role in the politics of most Central 
American nations, however, should not be taken in the 
modern sense. With clericalism ceasing to be a major issue 
in the twentieth century, the two parties simply came to 
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represent rival factions within the landed oligarchy. 
Thomas p. Anderson, Politics in Central America, (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p.l50« 
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Nicaragua's role in' the political life of the newly-
established United Provinces of Central America was very 
minimal. One questionable explanation that has been 
offered was that Nicaraguan population's calibre was lower 
vJhen compared to other provinces,' "During colonial days 
this region attracted fewer energetic Spaniards than the 
settlements on the salubrious highlands of Guatemala and 
Costa Rica." An increase in factional political violence 
saw a corresponding deterioration in the \inity of Central 
America after 1827 and by 1838, the United Provinces 
dissolved and each of the member provinces became independent 
republics. The isthmus became a region of what some have 
called city-states: small countries weak and vulnerable 
to outside forces, and with reduced possibility for 
economic growth and diversification. 
Political independence brought with it no accompanying 
social or economic revolution. The new Central American 
republics, Nicaragua included, retained important character-
istics established in the colonial era: 
i) Economies based on r^antation agriculture. 
ii) A concentration of large land-holdings in a 
few hands. 
iii) Societies lacking vigorous middle classes and 
dominated by the landowning elites. 
iv) Poor communications within the region and 
relative isolation from the outide world. 
v) Habits of authoritarian government. 
vi) Ingrained reliance on centralised state jurisdic-
tion and tolerance of corruption. 
10 Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America, (New York: 
Alfred A.Knopf, 1968) , p.75^ 
11 Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America, (Washington, D.C. : 1984), p.18. 
Politically/ the five nations called themselves 
republics and adopted constitutions modelled in many 
respects on the American Constitution of 1787 and on the 
12 liberal Spanish Constitution of 1812, The resulting 
governments had presidential and electoral systems resembl-
ing those of the United states. But the sijsbstance was very 
different. Judicial traditions based on Roman civil law 
served primarily to facilitate state control than as a 
bulwark of individual rights. The difficulties that arose 
from trying to reconcile two systems, one political and 
the other legal, with distinctly different founcations are 
still apparent in Central America today. 
In the meantime, however, the rivalry and competition 
continued unabated between the Liberals and Conservatives 
within the newly constituted independent republics. While 
this development followed a set pattern in the other Central 
American republics, the out-^ ome in Nicaragua was slightly 
different. By the middle of the nineteenth century. Liberals 
were the only force to recXon with in most of the region 
except Nicaragua. At that time, the dominant political 
questions were beginning to centre around economic issues^ 
with Liberals favouring expanded state assistance for the 
13 development of new agro-export industries. Thus, as the 
gradual displacement of the more aristocratic and tradi-
tionalistic conservatives by the liberals began, new forces 
of economic development came into focus and were encouraged. 
In Nicaragua, on the contrary, "where the Liberals were 
tainted more than elsewhere" by virtue of their earlier 
alliance with North American expansionists, "the conservatives 
14 
were able to hold on for much longer," 
12 I b i d . 
13 Stephen M. Gorman, n , 2 , p . 3 8 . 
14 Ralph Lee Woodward J r . , C e n t r a l America:A Nation Divided, (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , liJ56) , p p . 154-55. 
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The •warfare* between the liberals and the conserva-
tives was not generally related to differences in their 
philosophical approach to national issues. Rather, it was 
about power and the possibilities that power offered for 
enrichment. The two groups functioned more like tribes or 
armies than political parties and those who aspired to 
public office needed the talents of a warlord more than 
15 those of a political thinker. The two parties had 
individual capital cities, which each considered the 
national capital. Leon, the second largest city was the 
liberal stronghold, and Granada was the conservative 
centre, but thie warfare between them ranged all over the 
country. Managua was eventually selected as the centre of 
government in the hope that it might prove a neutral site. 
In large measure, it was this inability to resolve conser-
vative-liberal disputes peacefully that brought foreign 
intervention, either by governments or adventurers. In 
general it cannot be said that the United States Government 
found either the liberals or the conservatives more to its 
liking. Like the Nicaraguans themselves, it tended to 
find the personalities more compelling. 
The period between 1863 and 1893 saw a consolidation 
of conservative sway led by Tom Martinez over Nicaragua 
and to them goes the credit — the same role being played 
by their liberal counterparts in other countries -- of 
promoting the production of coffee, which was fast becoming 
a major cash crop for the rest of the region. 
This status qvio did not remain for long. In 1893, 
the conservatives were dramatically ousted from power by a 
15 Shirley Christian, Hicaraqua - Revolution in the Family, 
(New York :Random House, 1986) , p.5. 
16 Ibid. 
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l i b e r a l revol t led by Jose Santos Zelaya and yet again, 
Nicaragua found i t s e l f developing in a d i r ec t ion d i f fen t 
from the regional p a t t e r n . Liberalism under Zelaya was 
charac ter i sed by a v i ru l en t ant i - imper ia l i sm and in i t 
lay the seeds of the subsequent evolution of Nicaraguan 
nationalism. I n i t i a l l y , however, Zelaya too , l i ke the 
conservat ives , gave p r e f e r en t i a l treatment to US i n t e r e s t s , 
but when Washington decided t o take over the cons t ruct ion 
of the t ransoceanic canal in Panama, ra ther than bui ld i t 
across Nicaragua, he tume- h is back on the US and opened 
negot ia t ions with Prance on a loan t o finance the construc-
t ion of a railway l i n e . In 1909, when he decided to 
l iqu ida te Nicaragua's public debt , Zelaya ignored the New 
York banks and t o the great chagrin of American f inanc ia l 
c i r c l e s , turned to the London-based f inancia l group,the 
Ethelburg Syndicate. However, the main reason for the 
displeasure of the US Secretary of S ta te were the obs tac les 
ra ised by the Nicaraguan Government t o prevent the plunder 
of the count ry ' s mineral and fo res t resources by the 
American Fle tcher Corporation, of which the Secretary of 
17 S ta te , Philander Knox, was a major shareholder . The US 
lo s t no time whatsoever in engineering the l i b e r a l s ' over-
throw and a r e s to ra t ion of the more acceptable conservative 
ru l e . Subsequently the US maintained a m i l i t a r y presence 
in Nicaragua for 19 of the 21 years between 1912 and 1933, 
both to ensure co l l ec t ion of debts owed t o New York 
bankers and to defend conservat ives against the armed 
18 conspiracies of the l i b e r a l s . 
A s ign i f i can t development during the 1920s in Nicaraguan 
17 Angelo Col leoni , U.S. In te rven t ions - A Brief History, 
(New Delhi : S t e r l ing Pub l i she r s , 1984), p .101, 
18 T.w. Walker, Nicaragua : The Land of Sandino,(Colorado: 
West View p r e s s , 1981) , pp. 20-23. 
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politics was the neutralisation and virtual disappearance 
of ideological and philosophical differences between the 
liberal and conservative parties, and in the factional 
strife that flared in 1925, partisan ambition was the dominant 
motivation. Thxis, since the liberal party had discarded 
its extreme nationalism ane. anti-imperialism which it had 
acquired under Zelaya, the US found little difficulty in 
installing a liberal President in 1928, managing to do so 
without sacrificing even the least security or its 
interests in the country. The nationalistic, anti-imperialistic 
tradition was championed thereafter by movements outside the 
legal political system, beginning with the rebellion of 
Augusto Cesar Sandino in 1927, and culminating with the 
revolution of the Sandinista Front of National Liberation 
19 in 1979. ^  
Extended conservative r u l e , delayed economic develop-
ment, and d i r e c t foreign in te rvent ion strongly influenced 
the count ry ' s p o l i t i c a l revolu t ion . In so far as the 
p o l i t i c a l system i s concerned, the Nicaraguan experience 
may be considered as f a l l i ng somewhere between the experiences 
of Costa Rica and Guatemala, Costa Rica witnessed intense 
p o l i t i c a l competition between the Liberal and Conservative 
p a r t i e s ear ly on in i t s h i s t o r y but by the beginning of the 
20th century, the Costa Rican p o l i t y had come up with a 
more or less agreed-upon democratic framework to regula te , 
tha t competit ion. In Guatemala, on the other hand, p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s came to play second f iddle to p o l i t i c a l c aud i l l o s , 
who ruled the country by sheer force of t h e i r p e r s o n a l i t i e s . 
Thus,in comparison t o Costa Rica ' s p o l i t i c a l democracy 
predicated on par ty competition,and Guatemala's au thor i t a r i an 
19 Harry Vanden, 'The Ideology of I n s u r r e c t i o n ' , in 
T.W.Walker ( ed i t ed ) , Nicaragua in Revolution. (New 
York : Praeger Publ i shers , 1989), p . 27 . 
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tradition that rendered political parties irrelevant early 
in its hitory, Nicaragua, presents a mixture of both 
20 patterns. 
For more than a century, till the 1920s, Nicaraguan 
polity was in a constant state of flux. Much of the 
turbulence of the period was generated by friction between 
the liberals and the conservatives, as each endeavoured to 
acquire control over the state. In fact, the achievement 
of political stability in the country appeared a rather 
difficult proposition in the 1930s. The first signs of 
political stability, however, came with the establishment 
of the US-assisted Somoza dictatorship in 1936. The 
setting up of a National Guard, trained and equipped by 
the US under Somoza's control, was aimed at further 
reinforcing this stability. Although a dictator, Somoza, 
chose to rule Nicaragua disguised as a democratically 
chosen leader, and to that end he converted the liberal 
party into a vehicle for fulfilling his personal ambitions. 
At the same time, he continued to encourage the existence 
of the conservative party as a token opposition, mainly 
to silence his critics. 
The task of carrying on this masquerade of "democracy" 
was admirably managed by one or the other of the Somoza 
family over the next forty years while placing ultimate 
reliance on a military apparatus which, significantly, 
never achieved the slightest degree of institutional 
autonomy and therefore was incapable of becoming an 
21 
xndependent political actor." The consolidation of the 
Somocista dictatorship signified not only a closure of the 
20 Stephen M. Gorman, n.2, p.40, 
21 Ibid., p.41. 
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road to democracy based on open-party competition, but 
also a reduction in the probability of institutionalised 
military rule. Ultimately, the prevailing political-
economic order that arose under the Somozas could be preserved 
neither by the "election" of a figurehead opposition 
22 leader, nor the imposition of a military junta. The 
penetration of the political system and the national 
military by the Somozas was so complete that the destruction 
of the one became well-nigh impossible without a correspond-
ing and simultaneous destruction of the prevailing 
political system and the national military. Hence, change, 
once it came, was as a revolution. 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE REVOLUTION 
The revolution that humbled the Somozas has been viewed 
as a deliberate, "popul'arly supported attempt to restructure 
the political and economic relations that took shape over 
an extended period of dependent capitalist development in 
23 Nicaragua". By dependent capitalist development is 
rmeant economic activity in developing countries, which 
(1) treats labour as a coiwnodity and relies on the state 
to keep the price of that commodity artificially low; (2) 
is oriented towards external markets with which close 
financial and political ties are maintained, and (3) is 
largely engaged in either the production of primary products 
desired by developed market economies or value-added 
industrialisation in which the primary economic resource 
is extremely cheap labour. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., p.42. 
24 Ronald Chilcote and Joel Edelstein, Latin America: 
The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond, (Cambridge• * 
Schenkman, 1974), '• ^ * 
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It has been argued that the very nature of Nicaragua's 
economic development and the specific characteristics of 
the political system that came into existence to promote 
and protect that development eventually produced a level 
of lower class mobilisation and politicisation that led to 
political decay. That is not to suggest that revolution 
was inevitable, only that it became more likely as the 
society became increasingly complex and the dictatorship 
became increasingly inflexible. The techniques of social 
control that paved the way for the establishment of the 
Somoza dynasty in the 1930s became counter-productive as 
the society became more-complex and differentiated. The 
evolution of modern society and economic relationships 
required the institutionalisation of new capacities on the 
part of political authorities. But the foundations of 
^icaraguan economic development, the exploitation of cheap 
labour as the basis of efficient agro-export contributed 
to political intrasigence on the part of the dictatorship. 
AS a result, the regime lost legitimacy and grew more 
isolated. The inability or unwillingness of the traditional 
political parties to push effectively for any meaningful 
political change or economic reforms in turn provided an 
opening to more revolutionary solutions to the growing 
25 political crisis. 
The Sandinista Front of National Liberation (Fronte 
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional - FSLN) that became the 
political and military vanguard of national liberation 
of Nicaragua successfully preopted other political groups 
in the revolutionary process. It did'this by correctly 
identifying and utilising certain political undercurrents 
proauced by the country's dependent capitalist development. 
25 Stephen M. Gorman, n.2, p.66, 
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Specifically, the FSLN stressed the nationalistic, anti-
imperialistic nature of the struggle against the US-backed 
dictatorship. The theme of populism — which was completely 
ignored by the traditional political parties — also proved 
to be an important basis of appeal. Finally, the FSLN's 
call for a united front against the dictatorship during 
the final stage of the insurrection allowed most of the 
upper classes — who had been unable to devise a viable 
solution to the political crisis on their own — to abandon 
the dictatorship in favour of a popular government of 
national unity dominated by the Sandinista Front. There is, 
however, need for the assessment as regards the characterisa-
tion of the armed struggle. As Alfred Stephen says: "To 
classify it as a civil war would be misleading, because no 
social or geographical groups independently organised 
themselves to defend the regime." ' Rather, the struggle 
against a long-entrenched despot closely identified with a 
foreign power made the struggle against Somoza not so much a 
class war as a war of national liberation. "In this war of 
national liberation, the Catholic church as a corporate 
institution and even business groups acting under the 
occasional direction of the Chamber of Coitmerce, protested 
28 
against the regime". The Sandinistas did, of course, play 
a crucial role in galvanising resentment into insurrection — 
the special role of the vanguard. 
It is now generally recognised that actions on the part 
of the masses were determinant in the outcome of the struggle, 
26 Stephen M, Gorman, 'The Role of Revolutionary Armed 
Forces* in T.Walker ^edited), Nicaragua in Revolution, 
(New York : Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 115-19, 
27 Alfred Stephen, 'The US and Latin America : Vital Interest 
and the Instruments of Power', Foreign Affairs, 58{lil), 
(New York : Pergamon Press, 1980i , p. 680. 
28 Ibid. 
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AS Humberto Ortega, Commander-in-Chief of the Sandinistan 
Peoples Army and brother of former president of Nicaragua, 
Daniel Ortega, says: "I myself feel that it is very difficult 
to take power without a'creative combination of all forces of 
stiruggle wherever they can take place: countryside, city, 
town, neighbourhood, mountain, etc., but always based on the 
idea that the mass movement is the focal point of the struggle 
and not the vanguard, with the masses limited to merely 
29 
supporting it," 
These views of the relationship between mass and 
vanguard represent a qualitative change from the days of the 
conception of the guerilla foco, where the vanguard was 
seen as acting almost alone. At the same time, it represents 
a variation on the classical Leninist conception of a party 
of the working class and peasantry formed as a precondition 
for taking power. But it is a fact that party formation in 
Nicaragua would be seen as a task corresponding to the period 
of consolidation of revolutionaiy power rather than as an 
indispensable precondition for achieving it. 
THE DEVELOPJ'IENT OF THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 
During the liberation war under Sandino, all the sub-
altern sections of Nicaraguan society, which had previously 
acted in isolation from one another, or under the leadership 
of a fraction of the bourgeoisie, emerged as a single, 
autonomous historical subject, acting independently of the 
bourgeoisie for the first time in the country's history.While 
a few remnants of the Sandinistas had been destroyed, the 
popular resistance came in the 1940s to follow in the wake 
29 Marta Harnecker, 'Nicaragua : The Strategy of Victory', 
(Interview with PSLN Commander, Huumberto Ortega) , 
(Managua : Intercontinental Press, 1980), p.155, 
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of the conservative bourgeois opposition and was channelled 
and used by these forces. Both the coiwnanist party and 
the trade union movement were crushed by Somoza immediately 
afiter World War II. 
The first steps towards the beginning of a new auto-
nomous labour movement were taken by the transport workers 
in 1950s, with the foundation of a national \inion. 
The emancipation of the agricultural population from the 
tutelage of the conservative opposition began with the 
31 
cotton boom of the first half of the 1950s. This led to a 
pact between the conservative cotton bourgeoisie and Somoza, 
and, with the extension of cotton growing, to the proletariani-
zation of former small peasants and evictions from the land. 
The victims of this process could not but take an opposition 
stance against its initiatives. When falling cotton and 
coffee prices led to an economic crisis in the second half 
of the 1950s, and the assassination of Tacho Somoza also 
brought the regime into political crisis, this emancipation 
led to a large nxomber of strikes, mass struggles and the 
refounding of trade-unions and workers and peasants' asso-
ciations. The conservatives were now xinable to control and 
32 
channelise this movement. 
From this peasants', workers' and students' movement of 
the late 1950s grew the first — chiefly student — guerrilla 
groups, coming together in 1961-62 to form the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). The same movement 
30 Somoza converted the Liberal Party into his private party. 
The bourgeois opposition thus gathered around the conser-
vatives. The political content of these two major tra-
ditional political tendencies, however, had long since 
shifted. The conservatives no more ptirsued a consistently 
conservative policy than the Somocistas a liberal one. 
31 Harald Jung, 'Behind the Nicaraguan Revolution', New Left 
Review, 117, Sept.-Oct., 1979, p.73. 
3 2 Ibid. 
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led to the reconstruction of the communist party, the 
Partido Socialista Nicaraguense (PSN). From the movements, 
too, there arose the forerunners of the three major Nicara-
guan trade-xinion associations of today: the Confederacion 
General de Trabajadores (CX3T) , the Central de Trabaj adores 
de Nicaragua (CTN), and the Confederacion Unificacion 
Sindical (CUS) ."^"^  
In the countryside, it was chiefly the Sandinistas 
and philanthropic Christians who organised workers into 
unions and gave them their political education. Monastic 
orders organised peasant cooperatives and in this way took 
over the vision of society based on cooperation which 
Sandino's original peasant and worker soldiers had already 
dreamed of. 
In the cities, the same period saw the implantation of 
the communist party and the small left-wing Catholic Partido 
Social Cristiano (PSC), the Communist party later splitting 
34 into an orthodox and a "nationally independent" wing. The 
PSC led the CTN trade-union federation, and the Conmunists 
the CGT. From 1972 onwards, these trade unions were 
increasingly able to stage large-scale and comprehensive 
strikes and mass demonstrations, making social, economic and 
Specific political demands on the regime. 
Until 1974, the political groups of the bourgeoisie 
followed a very disunited, vacillating and contradictory 
policy vis-a-vis the Somoza clan and its Mafia regime. The 
clan was well aware of this and alternately involved different 
33 The CGT, the largest trade-union association, belongs 
to the World Federation of Trade Unions, the CTN to 
the World Confederation of Labour, and the CUS to the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
3 4 Harould Jung, 'Behind the Nicaraguan Revolution* in the 
Stanford Central America Action Network (edited), Revolu-
tion in Central America, (Colorado i ^ est view Press, 
1983), p,25. 
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fractions of the bourgeoisie in its criminal deals, seek-
ing always to break up the bourgeois opposition. 
From 1973 onwards, political crisis came increasingly 
to a head. Four factors were responsible for this: 
1. After the devastating Managua earthquake of 
December 1972, the Somoza clan usied the resultant 
international aid chiefly for its own enrichment. 
While victims of the earthquake were bleeding in 
Managua, the clan was selling the blood plasma 
received from international aid organisations at a 
good price in the United States. The people felt 
that the Nicaraguan Geernraent was in actual 
fact nothing but a criminal syndicate. 
2. With the build up of the military bourgeoisie 
after 1972, government corruption and economic 
crimes increased to such an extent that properly 
conducted business transactions became virtually 
impossible. Even the Somoza clan was no longer 
in a position to control the access of certain 
fractions of the bourgeoisie to crooked deals. The 
mechanism that had previously blocked the emergence 
of a united bourgeois opposition now increasingly 
began to fail. 
3. To support this military bourgeoise and make 07 
repayments on government blocked foreign debts, 
the regime steadily increased taxes on production 
and consvunption. This ever-rising tax burden, 
together with a rate of inflation that had reached 
almost 35 per cent in 1977, and the spread of 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., p.26. 
3 7 The industrialisation of the 1960s was largely financed 
by government loans from abroad on account of the low 
level of local savings. After 1975, the government 
attempted to stabilise economic development in a similar 
way. In 1977 the publicly guaranteed foreign debt stood 
at 836 million dollars as against a total GNP of 
only 2 billion. Debt servicing cost 104 million 
dollars in 1977, i.e,, 15.8 per cent of the total 
receipts from exports. Harald Jung, n. 34, 
p. 27, 
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criminal "competition" by the military bourgeoisie, 
brought the marginal and petty bourgeoisie injg 
particular to the verge of economic collapse. 
I 
4. A liberal policy on prices combined with restriction 
on wages, led from the mid-1970s to an increasing 
decline in real purchasing power for wage-earners, 
nominal wage increases failing to keep pace with 
inflation. 
It was against this background that these small opposi-
tion groups managed, from the middle of the 70s, to secure 
for themselves support from those sections of the population 
they represented. The opposition was broadly divided into 
two sections, represented on the one hand by the bourgeois-
dominated Union Democratica de Liberacion (UDEL), and on the 
other hand, by the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional 
(FSLN) . 
The UDEL considered itself a collaboration of labour 
and capital for the overthrow of the Somoza Government, and 
had no programme of social transformation. "It set its 
sights on the establishment of a capitalism, functioning 
according to market mechanisms, with a democratic form of 
bourgeois rule, in which exchange relationships between 
economic subjects would obey the principles of freedom 
and equality, and not be over-shadowed and made impossible 
39 by corruption, blackmail and dictatorial caprice." UDEL's 
strategy was designed to strengthen the opponents of Somoza 
in the USA by exposing the atrocities of his reoime, and 
38 In Managua, for e.g., officers sold vast quantities 
of electrical goods that had been smuggled into the 
country free of duty and at far below their usual 
market price. Taxi and bus firms were monopolised 
by National Guard officers, and several large estates 
were also distributed to the officers. Harald 
Jung, n. 34, p.27. 
3 9 Harald Jung, n. 34, p.27. 
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sxibsequently to force the dictator's recognition by a general 
40 
strike with US backing. 
The FSLN initially operated on the basis of Che 
Guevara's theory, but by 1964 had been almost destroyed, 
so that it began intensive political work among students and 
peasants. In 1966-67, it launched a new guerrilla war, was 
again defeated,and subsequently came to place the major 
weight of its activity on political work among peasant and 
agricultural workers, whom it intended to organise and 
educate for a protracted people's war. 
The tremendous growth in the number of people marginalized 
in urban slums and the development in the economic and 
political spheres since 1973, gave rise to a massive 
resistance potential in the cities as well. In 1975, the 
FSLN started discussing a new strategy in view of the above 
mentioned developments. It ended with the emergence of three 
distinct factions within the organisation. 
After 1975, the leadership of the majority faction 
opened the FSLN to non-marxist, politically committed 
Christians, who worked for liberation from the Somoza regime 
and for a socialism based on cooperatives. It thus managed 
to win much needed support of important sections of the 
church, which since the late 1960s had tuimed more strongly 
against the regime on humanitarian grounds. At the same 
time, the majority faction began to construct a political 
as well as a military organisation in the cities, to initiate 
and press forward the mass organisation needed for popular 
41 insurrection. 
40 UDEL, El Programa de UDEL (English Translation), Managua, 
1974. 
41 C. Fonseca Amador, 'Zero Hour in Nicaragua' in 
Tricontinental, Havana, Sept.-Oct., 1969, 
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The FSLN's strategy of entering into a tactical alliance 
with "bourgeois, opposition forces", paid dividends in so far 
as it resulted in the formation, in late 1978, of the 
Movimiento Pueblo Unido (MPU), with the adherence of more 
than twenty-two organisations. The MPU stood still more 
clearly than the PSLN for a socialist perspective on the 
basis of the nationalisation of all basic branches of the 
42 
economy. 
While the UDEL was busy organising a human rights 
campaign against Somoza among US public opinion, the US 
Congress decided in 1977 to continue military support to 
Somoza. It was in this background that the Sandinista 
military organisation began attacking the National Guard 
while its political wing organised demonstrations and 
strikes. 
The church and the trade unions were particularly 
active in supporting such actions and contributing to the 
formation of new popular organisations. At the same time, 
a group of prominent individuals from Nicaragua's economic 
and cultural life, the "Group of Twelve", declared that no 
solution was possible for the country without the participa-
tion of the FSLN, and that the entire opposition, including 
the Sandinistas, should combine in a common opposition 
front for the overthrow of the regime. High bourgeois 
dignitaries, members of the UDEL and sections of the church 
leadership sought to stir the dictator to a "national 
dialogue" and to reforros. 
However, the killing of UDEL chairman, Pedro Joaquin 
4 2 MPU, Programa de MPU, Managua, July 1978 (English 
translation) . 
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Chamorro in January 1978, apparently at the behest of 
Somoza/ thwarted moves of any national dialogue. Strikes 
were called and very soon they began to assume the forms 
of a violent popular insurrection. All this signalled 
the culmination of what purported to be a unification of 
all opposition forces against the Somoza regime. The 
fight for the 'liberation' of Nicaragua was thus on in 
right earnest under the leadership of a more or less 
unified opposition from 1978 onwards. 
chss^tmje XI 
ROLE OF IDEODOGY, CHURCH AND PRESS IN THE 
REVOLUTION 
The ideas that went into the making of the. Sandinista 
revolution in Nicaragua did not emerge full blown in the 
politically charged atmosphere that generally character-
ised Latin America after the Cxaban Revolution. Rather, 
these beliefs had their roots in the national past, in the 
history of a nation that strove to free itself from foreign 
domiftation and internal despotism* Mf Humbert© Ortega 
Saavedra pointed out so aptlys 
"We could say that we did not invent the 
fundamental elements of our liberation 
ourselves. The vanguard gathered these 
ideas from Sandino, from our own people, 
and this is what" enabled us to lead the 
people toward their liberty. We found 
political, military, ideological, and 
moral elements in our people, in our own 
history..."! 
Sanainisroo (the political philosophy ofAugust Cesar 
Sandino) became the repository of national consciousness. 
It represented the culmination of a long process that 
finally allowed the Nicaraguan people to gain an under-
standing of their own history. It became the ideological 
vehicle through which the national past was recaptured by 
the Nicaraguan masses. 
Before the advent of Sandino and Sandlnismo, Nicaraguans 
could not comprehend their present reality because of a lack 
of sense of history, A majority of the leaders of the 
1 Humberto Ortega Saavedra, La Revolucion a traves de 
nuegtra diyecion nacional (Managua:Secretaria Nacional 
de propaganda Educacion Politica del FSLN, 1980), p.9, 
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country failed to realise that the nation's development was 
not even remotely connected with aggrandisement of personal 
interest, or that cooperating with an expanding imperial 
presence would ultimately compromise national dignity and 
2 the nation itself. Gabriel Garcia Marquez affirms, 'a 
consciousness of history is a, necessary precondition for a 
3 
society's survival and autonomous development.' However, 
Vlicaraguans gained such a consciousness only through better 
than fifty years of Sandinista struggle. And even during 
the struggle, the reactionary forces 'always denied people 
4 
the knowledge of their own history.' 
The first traces of modern national consciousness, of 
which the Indian and mestizo population also formed part, 
emerged only towards the end of the nineteenth century in 
Nicaragua, This was over a generation after the pro-slavery 
adventurer William Walker and his band of mercenaries carried 
out the first in a long series of American backed ihter-
5 
vention in national affairs. It was only then that a few 
Harry E. Vanden, 'Ideology of the Insurrection,•in T.W. 
Vv'alker (edited) , Nicaragua in Revolution, (New York : 
Praeger, 1982) , p.424 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude, 
(New York : Avon, 1971) . 
Tomas Borge, ideologue of the FSLN, in Humbert© Ortega's 
Fifty years of Sandinista Struggle, Ministory of Interior, 
Managua, 1980, p.3* 
William Walker, an 'American soldier-of-fortune' was 
invited by the Liberals in 1855 to help them defeat the 
Conservatives, Not long after bringing them to power, 
however. Walker pushed the Liberal allies aside and 
declared himself president. Slavery was legalised and 
English became the official language. This bizarre turn of 
events not only catalysed both parties and all of the 
other Central American republics into a virtual holy war 
against 'the yankee interloper' but also so discredited 
the Liberals that the Conservatives were able to rule 
Nicaragua with little opposition for the next third of 
the century. 
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i n t e l l e c t u a l s began to look toward t h e i r d i s t a n t indigenous 
past to rediscover t h e i r na t i on ' s h i s t o r i c i d e n t i t y and thus 
transcend the narrow Hispanicism t h a t had cont inual ly 
constrained na t ional p o l i t i c s , thought, and l i t e r a t u r e . 
The Nicaraguan poet Ruben Dario, demonstrated in Prosas 
Profui^s how the roost remote seeds of the s t ruggle for 
na t ional l i b e r a t i o n and the development of a modern nat ional 
consciousness resided in the indigenous s t ruggle to r e s i s t 
Spanish co lon i sa t ion . Dar io ' s poe t ic s e n s i b i l i t y , in fac t , 
enabled him to see the cont inui ty of the s tuggle more 
c lea r ly than most Nicaraguan p o l i t i c i a n s of h i s day. 
The modernist poets who followed Dario contr ibuted t h e i r 
b i t too , to the growth of a h i s t o r i c i d e n t i t y in Nicaragua 
and were, with Dario, the founders of Nicaraguan l i t e r a t u r e . 
They were affected by the s o c i o p o l i t i c a l s i t ua t i on of 
Nicaragua, and were the f i r s t to rediscover an awareness of 
Nicaragua's popular h i s t o r y . In doing so they began to 
disseminate the ideas t h a t , as they found f e r t i l e ground in 
a people long denied an awa'-eness of t h e i r place in h i s t o ry , 
were to cont r ibu te to the gxx>wing n a t i o n a l i s t awareness t ha t 
was to become manifest in the s t ruggle of Sandino and h i s 
army to defend na t iona l soveireignty, 
A few of Nicaragua's Liberal p o l i t i c i a n s slowly began t o 
r e a l i s e tha t the count ry ' s p o l i t i c a l s t ruc tu re s were 
inadequate. Although the Liberal reform movement did not 
develop in Nicaragua vintil the l a t e 19th century, i t ca r r i ed 
a vis ion of socie ty s imi la r to t h a t of o ther reform movements 
in Mexico (under Benito Juarez) and elsewhere in Latin America. 
Ruben Dario, Prosas Prof\imas, v o l . 5 , (Madrid : C a s t i l l a , 
1953), p .763. \ 
28 
The interventionist policies of the United States, rang-
ing from establishment of puppet regimes to direct interven-
tion by US Marines tended to radicalise many supporters of 
the Liberal movement, and even prompted a few Conservatives 
to join the many armed uprisings against US-installed 
governments.^ The struggle began to thus taXe on clear 
nationalist and anti-imperialist overtones. With Sandino 
joining the Liberals after his return from Mexico, there 
came about a split in its ranXs over the question of 
acceptance of a United States arranged compromise solution 
regarding the Liberal-Conservative feud. While the other 
Liberal generals were in favour of following a rather non-
confrontationist path, Sandino spoke about freeing the 
country by a 'force of arms.' 
For the Sandinistas, Sandino*s example is important but 
so was his political thought. The latter was crucial to 
understanding the Nicaraguan revolution not only because it 
had influenced the thinking of the past and present 
Sandinista leadership, but also because the leadership 
believed the Revolution begun with Sandino rather than with 
the Sandinista movement reconstituted thirty years after 
g 
his death. 
Whatever the economic, political and sociological 
explanations of the revolution, the intellectual factors 
behind it derive from Sandino*s unique blend of revolutionary 
ideas. Although obsessed with America's domination and 
repeated political and military intervention in Nicaragua 
7 The Nicaraguan people were involved in some thirty armed 
uprisings between 1906 and 1926, Humberto Ortega, n.l, 
p,10. 
8 Donald C, Hodges, Intellectual Foundations of the 
Nicaraguan Revolution, (Austin : University of Texas Press, 
1986) , p,ix. 
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and the rest of Central America, Sandino did more than 
wage a war of liberation against a foreign intruder. Whereas 
he was astute enough to hide his political intentions from 
his immediate followers until conditions might be ripe for 
revealing them, his long-range goal was an economic, 
political and cultural transformation that would have ended 
9 
in revolution — it finally did. 
From its inception, Sandino's struggle both inspired, 
as was supported by the lower classes in Nicaragua. In 
contrast to the bourgeois politicians, even the humble 
prostitutes of Puerto Cabezas realised that the country 
needed armed mobilisation and not self-serving compromises 
with the forces of imperialism. Sandino and his Army to 
£>efend National Sovereignty were forced to rely on little 
more than their own ingenuity and the support of Nicaragua's 
lower classes. This was to become a popular national 
stnaggle par excellence, 
Sandino brought the wisdom of his previous life 
experience into the struggle. While his early life in rural 
Nicaragua linked him to the peasants and Indians in the 
countryside; his labour as a mechanic and worker in a 
variety of foreign and domestic corporations united him 
with the interests of the proletariat of Latin America and 
the rest of the world. His stint with the US-owned Huasteca 
Petroleum Company in Tampico, Mexico, saw him affected by the 
9 Ibid, 
10 A group of prostitutes in the Atlantic Coast town of 
Puerto Cabezas helped Sandino and his mates recover 
fifty rifles that the United States Marines had 
confiscated from other Liberal forces, 
11 Harry E, Vanden, n,2, p.44, 
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n a t i o n a l i s t radical ism of the Mexican revolut ion and soon 
'began to iden t i fy himself with a broad n a t i o n a l i t y embrac-
12 ing a l l Americans of Iber ian and Indian descent*. 
During the period of h is s tay in Mexico, Sandino was 
an eye-witness to the s t ruggles of m i l i t a n t o i l -workers 
against t h e i r employers in Tampico. He was exposed t o the 
nat ions of the I n d u s t r i a l Workers of the World (IWW), t o 
m i l i t a n t anarchism, and to Marxist i n t e rna t iona l i sm. From 
the ana rch i s t s , Sandino absorbed a s t rong dose of a n t i -
au thor i ta r ian ism, ant j .cler ical ism and an t l cap i t a l i sm; from 
the s o c i a l i s t s ^ h i s advanced programme of soc ia l l e g i s l a t i o n 
and s t ra tegy of a l l i ances with o ther progress ive forces , 
including hoped — for mater ia l and moral support from 
Mexico's revolut ionary government; and from the Coiranunists, 
his commitment to a worldwide p r o l e t a r i a n revolu t ion . In 
Tampico, Sandino also l en t a sympathetic ear t o the re l ig ious 
cur ren ts t h a t supported the Mexican Revolution, ' F r ee -
masonry, Mexican Spir i tua l i sm and the Magnet ic-Spir i tual 
School of the Universal Commune's custom-made fusion of 
14 anarchism and s p i r i t i s m ' are cur ren t s from which Sandino 
ass imi la ted h i s brand of theosophy. Many of these ideas — 
along with his ardent Nicaraguan and Latin American 
nationalism — would be manifested in h i s l a t e r thought 
and wr i t i ng . 
Although a Nicaraguan above a l l , Sandino r ea l i s ed 
t h a t Nicaragua's s t ruggle was pa r t of a l a rge r movement: 
12 Neil Macaulay, The Sandino Affair , (Chicago : 
r Quadrangle Books, 1967) , p .53 , 
13 Donald C, Hodges, n . 8 , p . 6 , 
14 I b i d . , p . 24, 
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'At the present, historical moment our struggle is national 
and racial; it will become international as the colonial 
and semi-colonial peoples unite with the peoples of the 
15 imperialistic nations'. Without being a Marxist, Sandino 
had an internationalist vision of a revolutionary nationalism 
that was linked to other revolutionary movements throughout 
the world. "It would not be strange for me and my army 
to find ourselves in any country of Latin America where 
the murderous invader had set his sights on conquest," 
he said. What had begun essentially as an outgrowth of a 
liberal uprising was being transformed into a revolutionary 
anti-imperialist struggle by the most exploited classes 
in the country. The political work of Sandino's growing 
army of miners, Indians, peasants, and artisans and the 
increasing sophistication and tenacity of their popular 
guerilla war had gained the support of the Nicaraguan 
masses, a growing number of Latin Americans, a few informed 
17 North Americans and many Latin American intellectuals. The 
ferocity of the conflict with the Marines made it imperative 
for Sandino and his followers to upgrade their military 
tactics and strengthen their ties with the rural masses who 
supported their struggle. 
It would be pertinent to make reference, at this 
Juncture, to the substance and direction of Sandino*s 
is N. Macaulay, n,12, p. 113« 
16 Sandino, as cited in Jose Benito Escobar, Ideario 
Sandinista, (Managua ; Secretaria Nacional de propaganda 
Educacion, 1980), p.5, 
17 Macaulay mentions, for instance, the support work 
done on Sandino's behalf by the poet Joaquin Gracia 
Monge (Costa Rica) , Gabriela Mistral (Chile) and 
Jose Carlos Marcategin (Peru). N. Macaulay, 
n,12, p. 113^ 
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ideology. This ideology which virtually unified the 
popular struggle was essentially a very flexible and non-
sectarian Third World Marxism that was carefully applied 
to the specific conditions in Nicaragua. Although it was 
influenced by the tactics and ideology of other Third World 
18 
nations, that also had to stmaggle for their liberation, 
Sandinisroo was very much Nicaraguan and was not a copy or 
19 imitation of any other nation. Specific tactics and 
strategies of the revolution were developed in the process 
of struggle as revolutionary theory tempered political and 
military action and was at the same time changed by it. 
Sandino's political assessments had as their primary 
focus the war in Nicaragua. Among the principal enemies 
of his country, he identified not only the Wall Street 
bankers and the United States government, but also the 
American people, personified by William Walker. To this 
list he added most,of Nicaragua's political leaders, both 
liberal and conservative, who were seeking an accommodation 
with the Americans. Against these enemies of the people 
stood his Defending Army of National Sovereignty. Like his 
pontemporary Mao Tse-tung, Sandino asked the same fundamental 
questions: 'Who are our enemies?" 'Who are our friends7• and 
•Who are the people?'. If Mao had a revolutionary theory 
predicated on his answers, so did Sandino, 
In an effort to make his views attractive to ignorant 
and illiterate peasants, Sandino gave them a dramatic cast. 
The American people were 'pirates', 'freebooters', 'blond 
beasts' and 'machos'. The Wall Street bankers worshipped 
18 Vietnam and Cuba, for instance. 
19 Harry E. Vanden, n,2, p.57, 
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the 'golden calf*. The White House appeared as a 'whited 
sepulcher', clean on the outside but rotten within. The 
political leaders of Nicaragua were 'traitors' and Judases 
who sold out their country for a few pieces of silver. In 
contrast, his Defending Army was presented as God's instrument 
for regeneration not only of Nicaragua#but also all of 
Central and South America, In short, he gave to his 
political thought an ideological coating. This has misled 
most students of Sandino into believing that he did not have 
a theory worthy of the name. 
A closer examination of the activating ideologies of 
Sandino would however disprove this claim. Whereas he 
might be correctly accused of not providing any original 
theory, Sandino should be given due credit for a very 
efficient assimilation of the principal revolutionary 
thoughts and political ideologies of th6 day into a more or 
less coherent framework. The objective was to rouse the 
Nicaraguan masses into standing up against the Somoza regime 
by putting forward a practical and emotionally appealing 
ideology. And in this, he met with a reasonable amount of 
success as subsequent events would go to show. 
It is important to note that the teachings of the 
Magnet ic-Spir i tual School, drawing insp i r a t ion mainly from 
21 Joaquin Trincado 's work, and i t s p o l i t i c a l p ro j ec t of the 
20 Donald C. Hodges, n . 8 , p . 2 2 / 
21 'The Five Loves ' - Joaquin Trincado (1866-1935) was a 
Spanish e l e c t r i c i a n l iv ing in Argentina. Although 
educated by p r i e s t s , he soon acquired a f ana t i c a l d i s -
l i k e for a l l forms of r e l ig ious indoc t r ina t ion . Anti-
c le r i ca l i sm was to become, i f not an obsession, the 
pervasive concern of h i s e n t i r e published work. He cal led 
for a new "communal f r a t e r n i t y with equal r i gh t s and 
dut ies to work and to consume, in which each produces 
what he can and consumes what he needs." This was to 
be achieved by founding a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l 
cooperatives managed by the workers themselves. 
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establishment of a universal commune amounting to 'the whole 
world communised* is what influenced Sandino in the ideological 
formation of what he calls 'rational communism". Sandino did 
not explain, however, his rather peculiar juxtaposition of 
•rational* and 'communist'. What is known is that his belief 
in a world communist revolution was based on his theosophy, 
which proclaimed itself rational rather than dogmatic. A 
• rational communist' to Sandino was a coramunist guided by 
Divine Reason. In the Light and Truth Manifesto, he identified 
the communist forecast df world revolution with the Final 
Judgement of the Scriptures wherein would happen the 
destruction of injustice on eart^ h and the reign of the spirit 
of Light and Truth, i.e.. Love. This final episode is divine 
and human history would be preceded by a world war,unleashed 
by the Wall Street bankers in an effori: to complete the 
construction of an inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua, 
an effort doomed to defeat because Divine Justice impelled 
Nicaraguans to stop them. 
Although Sandino rejected faith in a personal God and 
denied the divinity of Christ, calling him no more than the 
foremost champion of liberty, he acknowledged that there 
were personal benefits of professing a religious faith: 
'.,. it raises the peasant's hopes and aspirations because 
they think of themselves as actors in an eternal and ever-
renewed drama in which victory favours the just.' He was 
consequently not averse to encouraging religion in others. 
While he looked on established religion as an opiate of the 
masses, he believed that faith might also, given the necessary 
boost, become an impulse to revolution. 
An examination of the letters Sandino had written would 
lead us to understand that he thought his theosophical 
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beliefs supported revolutionary actions because they dissi-
pated the fear of death and encouraged the struggle for 
justice, Sandino was pragmatic enough to realise that 
if the revolutionaries were to be activated by a myth, 
this seemed better than inost. To give them more confidence 
he put forward a doctrifie of the reincarnation of the 
spirit and the eternal nature of life. Sandino's ideology 
may thus be seen to have two components. Ethically, he 
appealed to the values of patriotism and articulated a 
doctrine of hxoman rights tied to the word sacred. Theo-
logically, he mounted a system of beliefs predicated on a 
continuing war between the forces of good and evil, a final 
holocaust and the victory of divine justice. These non-
rational sources of motivation gave a tr^nendous impetus 
to his movement by strengthening the will to sacrifice. 
Having thus ensured the support of a majority of the 
Nicaraguans to his cause and realising that he would have to 
take recourse to armed struggle, Sandino began preparations 
for it. But not even the revolutionary government of 
• 22 
Mexico would offer Sandino and his followers any assistance. 
They were hence forced to become more and more self reliant 
and to learn how to make optimum use of their only abundant 
resource — the Nicaraguan people. Rifles from the Spanish-
American War, War material captured from the invaders, 
bombs made from the sardine cans the Marines discarded, and 
i sea of machetes wielded by ever more determined peasants — 
22 In his pamphlet, 'Manifesto a los pueblos de la tierra 
y en particular al de Nicaragua', Sandino recounts 
his trip to Mexico to secure material assistance 
for his army. He ends this Manifesto by saying 
that 'during the seven years of war that we have 
fought.,., we have not received any help nor have 
we accumulated any political debts with any one.* 
(p. 24) . 
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such were t h e armaments used t o c o n f r o n t machine guns and 
23 d i v e bombers. 
Th i s was one o f the f i r s t modern examples o f what a 
g u e r i l l a army w i t h mass support c o u l d do a g a i n s t a t e c h n o -
l o g i c a l l y s u p e r i o r i n v a d e r , even when the l a t t e r was 
supported by l o c a l q u i s l i n g s and t h e mercenary m i l i t a r y 
f o r c e s a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l . Mobi le g u e r i l l a bands as 
t h e components of an e g a l i t a i r i a n p e o p l e ' s army, p o l i t i c a l 
as w e l l as m i l i t a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n , i n t e g r a t e d p o l i t i c a l and 
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , c l o s e t i e s t o t h e p e a s a n t s , and, most 
i m p o r t a n t , p o p u l a r support and i n v o l v e m e n t — such were the 
l e s s o n s t o be l e a r n e d from S a n d i n o ' s p e o p l e ' s war a g a i n s t 
i m p e r i a l i s m . These l e s s o n s were not t o be f o r g o t t e n by the 
l e a d e r s h i p of t h e FSLN. S a i d Ortega , ' I n the s t u d y of 
Sandinism, i n which our Commander C a r l o s Fonseca was t e a c h e r 
and example, we found the important e l e m e n t s t o a c h i e v e our 
t r i u m p h . ' 
Nor d i d o t h e r s mis s the importance o f the nature o f 
S a n d i n o ' s s t r u g g l e — Che Guevara ' d i s c e r n e d the r e a s o n s 
f o r S a n d i n o ' s s u c c e s s i n r e s i s t i n g t h e Marines : t h e 
i n s p i r a t i o n a l q u a l i t y o f h i s l e a d e r s h i p and h i s g u e r r i l l a 
26 
t a c t i c s ' . C o l o n e l A l b e r t o Bayo, t h e Spanish Republ ican 
g u e r r i l l a f i g h t e r who l a t e r t r a i n e d C a s t r o ' s o r i g i n a l f o r c e 
in Mexico , was a l s o much impressed by t h e m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s 
27 S a n d i n o ' s army employed, 
23 N.Macaulay, n . l 2 . Chapters 4 , 5 and 6 . A l s o s e e 
Gregor io S e l s e r , Sandino^ g e n e r a l de horobres l i b r e s , 
( E n g l i s h T r a n s l a t i o n ) , Csan J o s e : U n i v e r s i t a r i a 
Centroamericana, 1 9 7 9 ) , p p . 3 4 0 - 4 1 . 
24 Harry E. Vanden, n . 2 , p . 4 5 , 
2 5 Hximberto Ortega , n , l , p . 9 . 
26 N. Macaulay, n , 1 2 , p . 2 6 2 . 
27 I b i d . 
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Tragically, although Sandino's po l i t i ca l support had 
enabled him to achieve his primary objective — the 
c 
departure of all foreign troops — he disbanded his army 
before he could achieve the far-reaching political and 
economic change he was planning at the time of his murder 
in 1934. His death at the hands of Somoza's National 
Guard signalled the beginning of a systematic slaughter 
of his followers and a destruction of all that he stood 
for. Some Sandinist columns fought on for a few more 
years in remote areas, but they too were eventually forced 
to abandon systematic armed resistance. Nonetheless, the 
spirit of Sandino and the example of his army lived on in 
the popular mind, nourished by eye witness accounts and 
first hand stories from Sandinist survivors. 
The assasination of Somoza by a young Nicaraguan poet 
Rigoberto Lopez Perez in 1956 not only avenged Sandino 
but spurred a much-needed re-examination of national 
"onscience that would increasingly challenge the status 
quo. Bringing Sandino to justice and the subsequent series 
of armed movements were done outside of the tutelage of the 
bourgeis opposition, and came to be the first attempts to 
reintegrate the revolutionary Sandinist movement; they 
represent an important step in the revolutionary war begun 
28 by Sandino . 
L i t t l e by l i t t l e t h e s p i r i t of Sand ino ' s s t r u g g l e was 
once again be ing f e l t a c ros s the l and , A new wave of 
g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s broke out in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e ; one of 
the more famous of t h e s e was l e d by Ramon Raudales , a 
ve t e r an of S a n d i n o ' s army. 
28 Humbert© Ortega Saavedra , 50 anos de Lucha S a n d i n i s t a , 
(Managua : M i n i s t r y of I n t e r i o r , 1980) , p . 8 1 . 
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By the late 1950s, sectors of the Nicaraguan people 
were beginning to recover their popular history through 
the continuation of Sandino's stjruggle. But now historic 
conditions had changed substantially from the time of the 
first Sandinist struggle, western-style bourgeois democracy 
was increasingly being called into question in the Third 
World. The ardent Mexican nationalism that had so inspired 
Sandino was in large part discredited among Latin American 
intellectuals because of the failure of subsequent Mexican 
regimes to implement the economic and social transformations 
29 
promised by the Mexican Revolution. Henceforth, Third 
World nationalist movements would increasingly turn to 
Socialism and Marxism to explain their realities and 
nourish their revolutionary movements. Nicaragua would be 
no exception. 
In Latin America, the development of Marxism before 
the advent of the Cuban Revolution did not facilitate the 
application of the ideology to national conditions. 
Moreover, the type of Marxism that was espoused by the 
Communist Parties in Latin America tended to be dogmatic, 
sectarian, and generally not well suited to Latin American 
conditions. The development of Nicaraguan communism, 
with an ideology modelled after that of the Stalinist 
bureaucracy in the Soviet Union, was no different. It was 
consequently ill-equipped to creatively fuse Marxism with 
the national reality of Nicaragua. Nonetheless, the Party 
was virtually the only institution in the country where 
Marxist ideas were taken seriously. 
The Nicaraguan Socialist Party initially dismissed 
29 Harry E. Vanden, n.2, p.51. 
30 Ibid. 
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Sandino as a petty-bourgeois nationalist and, like the 
other traditional Communist Parties in Latin America during 
the early 1950s and 1960s, was unwilling to engage in 
revolutionary activity. But the example of the Cuban 
Revolution led them into believing that guerrilla warfare — 
31 
as outlined by Che Guevara — was the best method of 
implementing political change. 'With the victory of the 
Cuban Revolution, the rebellious Nicaraguan spirit 
recovered its brilliance. The Marxism of Lenin, Fidel, Che, 
Ho Chi Minh was welcomed by the new revolutionary organisa-
tion — the FSLN'.^^ 
The new generation of Sandinistas thus began a move-
ment that was the continuation of the popular struggle of 
August Sandino's guerrilla army. Drawing heavily on the 
Cuban revolutionary experience and the writings of Che 
Guevara and Fidel Castro, they began to reinterpret Sandino's 
original struggle in light of historic and ideological 
developments following his death. Even during his guerrilla 
war, Sandino had concluded that the Liberal and Conservative 
politicians were traitors and cowards and must be replaced 
33 by worker and peasant leaders. By studying their own 
fight for national identity and liberation in light of 
similar struggles in Cuba, Vietnam and elsewhere, the 
Sandinistas were able to build on Sandino's populist notions 
and began to infuse their movement with a coherent ideology. 
31 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (London : Penguin, 
1969) . 
3 2 Carlos Fonseca, Sandino Proletaria, (Managua : Propa-
ganda and Political Education Secretariat, 1980), p,6. 
3 3 Sergio Ramirez, Analisis Historico - Social del 
Movimiento Sandinista, (Encuentro ; Revista de la 
Universidad Centroamericana, 1982), p.12. 
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THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH 
Prior to I960, national churches in Latin America 
presented a uniformly traditional religious image, accom-
panied by sharply conservative social and political 
attitudes. Virtually everywhere, including Nicaragua, the 
church was an ally of the old order. While the Nicaraguan 
Catholic Qhurch was "blind to social problems" and aligned 
34 
with a government that was "hated by the people", the 
Evangelical Church was hardly different, although it 
tended to be apolitical rather than openly aligned with 
the regime. 
The f i r s t s i g n s of change in t h e Nicaraguan C a t h o l i c 
Church appeared in t h e l a t e 1960s, s t i m u l a t e d by t h e 
h i s t o r i c La t in American Bishops Conference a t Mede l l i n , 
Colombia, in 1968. Medel l in sought t o apply reforms of 
• 35 
the second Vat ican Counci l t o La t in America and i t 
p r e c i p i t a t e d a dynamic p roces s of r e f l e c t i o n and e x p e r i -
36 
menta t ion w i t h i n the Church. An emphasis on i d e n t i f y i n g 
the Church wi th t h e poor led t o the assumption of a more 
37 p r o p h e t i c a t t i t u d e towards s o c i e t y and p o l i t i c s . 
The p r o p h e t i c a t t i t u d e was exp res sed in a theo logy of 
l i b e r a t i o n which i n t e r p r e t e d the gospe l as demanding t h a t 
C h r i s t i a n s be a fo rce a c t i v e l y working t o l i b e r a t e the 
g r e a t ma jo r i t y from p o v e r t y and d e p r e s s i o n . By t h e raid-1970s, 
34 The C a t h o l i c Church in N i c a r a g u a , ( R e p o r t of t h e US 
Ca tho l i c P r e s s A s s o c i a t i o n , 1962) , p , 1 8 , 
35 Convened i n 1962 xinder Pope John XXIII . 
36 Michael Dodson and T.S.Montgomery, 'The Churches in the 
Nicaraguan R e v o l u t i o n , i n T.W. Walker ( e d i t e d ) , Nicaragua 
in Revo lu t ion . (New York i p r a e g e r , 1982) , p.ieU 
37 The concept of a p r o p h e t i c church i s d i s c u s s e d a t 
l e n g t h m Michael Dodson, ' P r o p h e t i c P o l i t i c s and 
P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y ' , P o l i t y , X I I ( 3 ) , 1980, p p . 388-408. 
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even where theological reflection was not very sophisticated, 
the theology of liberation had become the common coin of 
discourse among progressive Catholics and Protestants, It 
is in this context that we must understand the transition 
of the Nicaraguan Catholic and Evangelical Churches from 
conservative defenders of the status quo to outspoken 
opponents of Somocismo and even to a remarkable degree, 
active participants in the Sandinista Revolution. 
Important segments of the Catholic and Evangelical 
Churches in Nicaragua became revolutionary in the years 
between 1972 and 1979 by virtue of coming to identify the 
Christian liberation of their people with the armed struggle 
led by the FSLN. Although weak in resources, the Nicaraguan 
Churches at the base were so strong that they were able to 
withstand regime and hierarchy pressure and to participate 
actively in a popular political struggle. The role of the 
Church in Nicaragua can be explained in terms of four 
38 themes: 
1. The emergence of a prophetic point of view following 
Vatican II and Medellin -coincided in Nicaragua with the 
deependlng of anti-Somoza sentiment throughout the country, 
especially after the 1972 earthquake. During this devasta-
tion cind after, Managua was utterly dependent on relief 
supplies coming in from outside the country. The Church was 
an important mediator of the relief effort, mvich of which 
came from international church agencies. This rapproachment 
between the Church and the Somoza regime lasted only a few 
weeks, until Somoza forced all relief supplies to be 
processed through the offices of his own Liberal Party. This 
38 Michael Dodson and T.S. Montgomery, n.36, p.163. 
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overtly political manipulation of humanitarian aid almost 
immediately alienated the Church. The radicalisation of 
the Church coincided with the growing strength and popular 
acceptance of the PSLN. 
2. While some of its key leaders were Marxist, the FSLN 
was not, on the whole, anti-religious. Indeed, it accepted, 
even encouraged. Christian participation in the revolution. 
3. In many areas in Nicaragua the Churches came to be the 
only source of refuge for people facing repression. By 
providing refuge, the churches came under attack themselves 
and so became a focal point of popular resistance. Follow-
ing the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in January 
1978, the Churches became crucial sources of refuge for 
participants, including combatants in the armed struggle, 
and an important tactical resource for the FSLN, especially 
in the poorest areas of such cities as Masaya* Leon, Esteli 
and Managua, where repression was the heaviest. 
4. The Catholic Church hierarchy became anti-Somocista, 
or at least was perceived that way by the people, even 
though it never became pro-Sandinista. By playing the role 
of mediator between the FSLN and Somoza in such crises as 
the taking of the Palace in August 1978, the Church gained 
credibility with the FSLN. So, in the insurrection, the 
weight of the institutional Church was perceived in the 
popular imagination as anti-regime. Meanwhile, much of the 
Evangelical leadership within the country openly embraced 
the FSLN as the legitimate representative of the Nicaraguan 
people. 
The activities of the churches consequent upon the 
assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, which included 
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making bombs, accximulating supplies and teaching of first 
aid courses by clergymen, were accompanied by exceedingly 
painful reflections on the meaning of religious principles 
and teachings. They were forced to ask, as one participant 
39 put it, "What do we do to live our faith?" The prospect 
was frightening indeed, particularly in light of the 
violence it portended. Yet there was also a sense of a 
clear spiritual call to face this reality. They confronted 
"an enormous paradox of God's presence amidst terrible 
40 
evil." The experience brought the Christian communxty 
together in a powerful way. The centrality of prayer in 
their daily life was dramatically heightened. In 
September 1978, when the general uprising began. Christians 
throughout Nicaragua had accepted the need for revolution 
in the country. When the final insurrection began the 
following May, they were prepared to fight or to assist the 
combatants until victory. 
It is pertinent to note that the Nicaraguan Churches 
played a key-role in providing the FSLN with a justifying set 
of myths. To salvage Sandino's ideology and adapt it to 
the people's Catholicism, the FSLN had to get rid of its 
theosophical content. It incorporated the ethical left 
overs into its cult of 'the new man' and doctrine of hvunan 
rights. At the same time, a Christian version of the new 
man based on a reinterpretation of the moral values of 
Christianity developed alongside the FSLN's version and 
partly coalesced with it. in addition, a movement to 
reinterpret Christian faith in the light of the revolutionary 
39 Ibid. 
40 Interview of Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo of 
Managua by peggy Dillon, (Managua : July 29, 1980), 
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process gave rise to a liberation theology, seeking to fulfil 
the void left by Sandino's now obsolete philosophy. 
While earlier on as well, there was a recognition 
of the fact that "the historic experience of the past 
decades shows that the present revolutionary or social 
myths may deepen human awareness in the same way as did the 
religious myths of antiquity, •* it was left to Father 
Ernesto Cardenal, a Catholic priest who went on to become 
Nicaragua's minister of. Culture after the 1979 revolution, 
to work on a reconciliation between Christian principles 
and Marxism. 
Although Ernesto Cardenal's theology is far from 
'representative of liberation theology in Nicaragua, it is 
closest to representing the political and ideological views 
of the FSLN. It is one of the few theologies of liberation 
to give a religious significance to the new Marxism and its 
extreme communist orientation makes it the only living 
sxibstitute for Sandino's Communist theosophy. 
Father Cardenal has made two significant contributions 
to the ideology of the Nicaraguan Revolution: first, the 
development of a unique theology of liberation whose key 
to the Scriptures was humanity's collective rather than 
personal existence; second, the adaptation of this 
theology to the Marxist class struggle. Together, they 
provide a religious justification of the Nicaraguan 
Revolution for those Sandinistas who are both Christians 
41 
and Marxists. 
Among the distinguishing features of liberation theology 
41 Donald C. Hodges, n.8, p.143, 
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is a critical reflection based on the Gospel in response to 
the struggle for liberation by the oppressed and exploited 
42 • 
peoples of Latin America. At the same time it|s a form 
of action/ "a theology which does not stop with reflecting 
on the world, but rather tries to be a process through 
43 
which the world is transformed," "Besides actual 
struggles of liberation, the new theology is a response to 
the thinking of Latin American revolutionaries, a response 
to the new Marxism that began with Marietegui and was later 
44 
revived by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro. 
r 
Another feature of liberation theology was the recovery 
of the original revolutionary beliefs of Christianity. Unlike 
the traditional and reform currents in Roman Catholicism, 
liberation theology spoke with the voice of the poor and 
oppressed, who were raised to the status of God's Chosen 
people. Salvation was projected on to the screen of 
history, and thus ceased to be other worldly or metaphysical. 
Itfocussed not on the personal longing for eternal life but 
the collective longing for a new society without exploitation. 
THE ROLE OF THE PRESS 
The revolutionary war in Nicaragua was in part a war 
of words with major battlefields on the front pages of the 
newspapers and television screens both in Nicaragua and in 
the United States. Throughout the vqpsurge, Anastasio Somoaa 
maintained firm control of the military apparatus,but his 
42 Gustavo Guitirrez, A Theology of Liberation,(New York : 
Orbis, 1973) , p,IX. 
43 Ibid,, p,15. 
44 Ibid,, pp, 90-91. 
45 Donald C, Hodges, n.8, p.275, 
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inability to win complete control of the channels of 
conmunication despite the use of strong-arm tactics was 
pivotal in his downfall. Clearly the revolution was the 
product of a nexus of events and conditions, including 
the bloodshed, hardship, and sacrifice of hundreds of 
thousands of Nicaraguan people. "But without the constant 
'assault of the opposition press and the failure of the 
government propaganda machine, the Somoza family might 
46 
still be in power today". 
For a better understanding of the function of the 
media in the Nicaraguan revolution, two of its important 
characteristics should be explained: 
1. AS in most other Latin American nations, Nicaragua 
offers a classic case of collaborative journalism in which 
journalism was used by political combatants to further 
their causes. The Nicaraguan media were closely allied 
with political factions before the Revolution and continued 
to be allied with significant political, economic and 
religious groups after the PSLN victory in 1979. 
2. Latin American media are better described as class 
47 
media than mass media. The Nicaraguan example was hardly 
different. In Nicaragua, where the per-capita n\amber of 
news-paper copies, radio ireceivers and television sets has 
been among the lowest in the Americas, and the majority of 
the population was illiterate until 1980, the pre-revolutionary 
46 John Spicer Nicholas, 'News Media in the Nicaragua Revo-
lution', in T.W. Walker (edited), Nicaragua in Revolu-
tion, (New York : Praeger, 1982), p.81, 
47 "^ his is because most Latin Americans, owing largely to 
widespread illiteracy and scarce economic resources, 
are unable to use much more than a transistor radio. 
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media played a significant role only for the privileged 
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classes. And to the extent that the opposition press 
did affect the broader base of Nicaraguan people, it was 
not so much for its content, but rather as a political 
symbol. The latter phenomenon continued to be an important 
element in post-Somoza Nicaragua. 
The n a t i o n ' s f i r s t newspaper . E l T e l e g r a f o Nicaraguense , 
was founded in 1835 by t h e p r e s i d e n t of t h e c o u n t r y , J o s e 
Zepada, mostly as a p o l i t i c a l t o o l r a t h e r than a means of 
d i s semina t ion of news. In t h e fo l lowing cen tu ry and a 
ha l f , most newspapers were founded t o expouse t h e cause of 
a l o c a l C a u d i l l o ( l e a d e r ) , economic o r o t h e r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t 
g roups , o r , most o f t e n , one of N i c a r a g u a ' s two major 
p a r t i e s — the L i b e r a l s o r t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e s . S i m i l a r l y , 
t h e f i r s t r ad io system in Nicaragua was founded in 1931 fo r 
pu rpos ive ends . Because S a n d i n o ' s army f r e q u e n t l y des t royed 
t e l e g r a p h and t e l e p h o n e l i n e s and d i s r u p t e d m i l i t a r y 
commxinicationSj US marines occupying the count ry a t t h e t ime 
responded by b u i l d i n g the Radio Nac iona l network. The 
h e r i t a g e of m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l of b r o a d c a s t i n g a f f e c t e d t h e 
49 
ownership and r e g u l a t i o n of r a d i o , and s u b s e q u e n t l y , 
t e l e v i s i o n th roughou t the Scxnoza family r u l e , and con t inued 
t o a f f e c t p o l i c y under S a n d i n i s t a r u l e . T e l e v i s i o n was 
founded in 1955 as a commercial e n t e r p r i s e of the Somoza 
family and i t s a l l i e s . 
Th i s t r a d i t i o n of c o l l o b o r a t i v e media e s p e c i a l l y 
a p p l i e d t o t h e major f i g u r e in the h i s t o r y of Nicaraguan 
j o u r n a l i s m , Pedro Joaquin Charaorro Ca rdena l . I n 1930, 
Chamorro 's f a t h e r bought the newspaper La P r e n s a , a forum 
48 John S p i c e r N i c h o l s , n . 46, p . 1 8 2 , 
49 N i c a r a g u a ' s most widely used medium. 
,50 John Sp i ce r N i c h o l s , n . 46 , p . 1 8 3 . 
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for the Conservative platform and eventual ly an in t e rna t iona l 
symbol of opposit ion t o the Somoza's and the Libera l P a r t y ' s 
dominance of Nicaragua. The younger Chamorro, who had 
es tab l i shed his c r eden t i a l s as a p o l i t i c a l m i l i t a n t with an 
anti-Somoza b i a s , became publ isher of La Prensa following 
the death of h i s fa ther in 1952. 
While the Somozas did not invent censorship and other 
forms of repression of the press in Nicaragua, they were 
probably more zealous and cons i s t en t in t h e i r app l i ca t ion . 
Long s t re tches of censorship were common in Nicaragua frdm 
1936 t o 1961, including during the p o l i t i c a l l y v io len t year 
of 1954, In the subsequent yea r s , censorship often was so 
s t r i c t tha t the newspapers were not allowed t o publish the 
fact tha t they were being censored. 
La Prensa*s e d i t o r developed a novel means of communi-
ca t ing with i t s readership in t h i s background. Everytime 
the censors de le ted an a r t i c l e from La Prensa, the e d i t o r s 
would replace i t with a photograph of Hollywood s t a r Ava 
Gardner; photographs which were to soon become a widely 
51 
recognised symbol of Scxnoza repress ion . According to 
52 Pablo Cuadra, the Ava Gardner p i c tu re s g rea t ly increased 
both La Prensa ' s c i r c u l a t i o n and c i t i z e n opposit ion to the 
Somoza r u l e . 
Government cont ro l 'of the mass media became more subt le 
as the Nicaraguan presidency descended the Somoza family 
t r e e . In the 1960s.and ear ly 1970s^ the Somozas r e l i e d l e s s ' 
on formal censorship and other forms of overt repression and 
reore on methods such as hoarding news p r i n t , withholding 
51 I b i d . , pp. 184-85. 
5 2 Pablo Antonio Cuadra was a popular Nicaraguan poet , a 
long time assoc ia te of Chamorro and the pos t - revolut ionary 
e d i t o r of La Prensa. 
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advertising/ levying heavy taxes on machinery and repair 
parts for the opposition press, and cutting off special 
privileges to cooperative reporters. Yet the most 
effective control was ownership of the media. An over-
whelming majority of the nation's radio and television 
stations was either owned directly by the Somoza family 
or its cronies, or controlled by the National Guard. 
Likewise, the Somozas invested heavily in the country's 
sparse print media, including outright ownership of the 
Managua daily Novedades. Under the weight of the 
combination of controls, virtually all of the opposition 
press collapsed, with one important exception — La Prensa. 
La Prens^'s dogged opposition, that eventually made 
Chamorro not only a regional cause celebre among press 
organisations and human rights groups but also a popular 
lecturer and interview subject in the USA forced Somoza to 
restore formal censorship in 1974. But this restoration only 
raised Chamorro's international image and further tarnished 
Somoza*s. Amnesty International, the Organisation of American 
States,the Carter administration in the United States and 
other groups brought heavy pressure on Somoza to end censor-
ship as part of a package to end human rights violations in 
Nicaragua. Somoza relented in 1977, which opened the door 
for some of Chamorro's most acid criticism.^'^ 
r Somoza was trapped in a hopelessly downward spiral. 
Each time he punished Chamorro for his polemics, he also 
boosted Chamorro's reputation abroad and eroded his 
government's support from its most important patron— United 
States, Each action or inaction by Somoza inevitably 
53 Ibid,, p.186. 
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r e q u i r e d t h a t he would have t o t a k e h a r s h e r a c t i o n a g a i n s t 
Chamorro in the f u t u r e . In the end, i t was Chamorro who 
had earned t h e g r e a t e s t c r e d i b i l i t y i n t h e US. For t h a t 
r ea son , t he a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Chamorro i n January 1978 
produced a wave of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h e Somoza 
dynas ty and c o n t r i b u t e d t o the government ' s d o w n f a l l . 
Indeed, many Nicaraguan and fo re ign a n a l y s t s argue 
t h a t Chamorro's a s s a s s i n a t i o n was t h e spa rk t h a t touched 
off t h e f i r e s of the r e v o l u t i o n . ^ ^ Regardless of t h e 
exac t e f f e c t of h i s a s s a s s i n a t i o n , Chamorro and h i s 
newspaper, a f t e r a lmost t h r e e decades of o p p o s i t i o n , became 
n a t i o n a l symbols fo r a l l of the i d e o l o g i c a l l y d i v e r s e 
enemies of Somoza, 
In r e t r o s p e c t , i t may be s a i d t h a t th roughou t t h e i r 
r u l e , t h e Somoza family showed g r e a t adep tness a t r e p r e s s -
ing o p p o s i t i o n among the p e a s a n t and working class and cooptlng 
p o t e n t i a l opponents in ,the middle c l a s s e s w i th l a r g e - s c a l e 
c o r r u p t i o n , and by pe r suad ing t h e l a t t e r group of t h e 
communist o r a n t i - b u s i n e s s t h r e a t of the former. The 
Somoza f a m i l y ' s g reed du r ing t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n fo l lowing 
the 1972 ea r thquake des t royed t h e f i n a n c i a l advantage of 
' m i d d l e c l a s s c o o p e r a t i o n wi th t h e reg ime, and La P r e n s a ' s 
i n c r e a s i n g l y sympa the t i c coverage of t h e g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s 
he lped t o a l l e v i a t e t h e s u s p i c i o n of t h e newspaper ' s l a r g e l y 
middle and u p p e r - c l a s s r e a d e r s and thus paved t h e way t o a 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y a l l i a n c e . Also , the nega t i ve px ib l i c i t y v i a 
La p r e n s a fanned u n r e s t w i t h i n the N a t i o n a l Guard, Somoza's 
t r a d i t i o n a l power b a s e , and encouraged t h e o p p o s i t i o n in the 
b e l i e f t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s might not b r i n g American i n t e r v e n t i o n 
a f t e r a l l . 
54 Thomas P.Anderson, P o l i t i c s in C e n t r a l America (New York; 
P r a e g e r , 1982) , p.lT"^ ^ 
55 John S p i c e r N i c h o l a s , n . 4 6 , p . 1 8 6 , 
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INSURRECTIOW^^ ¥:BE<33^ NING AND 
END OP^SeMCZAS 
The social impact of the forty or more years of Somosa 
rule in Nicaragua was profound and generally negative. 
Though a large and entangled social service bureaucracy 
was created in the early 1960s in order to take advantage 
of opportunities provided by the j^ Iliance for Progress, 
few benefits 'trickled down' to the masses. The new 
programmes served largely as a way of providing employ-
ment and opportunities for the personal enrichment for the 
Somoza elite and its middle-class allies. Meanwhile, the 
economic policies of the regime were causing very real 
hardship for the common citizen. As the international 
demand for additional products such as "cotton grew, 'new' 
lands were opened to the monied elite, AS in the days of• 
the 'coffee boom' almost a century before, individual 
peasants once again were driven from the land, particularly 
from the Pacific lowlands. This process of rural disloca-
tion contributeu in turn to an accelerated rate of urbanisa-
tion, especially in the late 1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately, 
by this time, the social service bureaxicracy, which might 
have helped ease the suffering of the rural-urban migrants, 
was so helplessly corrupt and jnept that the problems of the 
poor were, in fact largely neglected. 
The disintegration and collapse of th« Somoza system 
began in the early 1970s under Anastasio Somoza Debayle. 
During this period, Nicaraguans of all classes became 
1 T.w. Walker, Nicaragua in Revolution, (New York : Praeger 
Publishers, 1982), pTl?; ' 
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increasingly alienated by the intemperate dictator's grow-
ing greed and brutality. Two major events accelerated the 
process of popular disaffection. The first was the 
•Christmas' earthquake of 1972, which destroyed roost of the 
capital city, Managua. In the wake of this disaster, Somoza 
and his accomplices used their control of the government to 
funnel international relief funds into their own pockets, 
very little was done for the disaster victims and, until 
the Sandinista victory, most of Managua remained an 
unreconstructed moonscape. Two years after the quake, when 
the FSLN pulled off a very successful hostage-ransom 
operation, Somoza again showed an intemperate reaction. 
Humiliated and enraged by the FSLN's success, the dictator 
declared a state of siege, instituted full censorship of 
the press and launched the Guard on a campaign of terror 
in rural areas where FSLN guerillas were believed to be 
operating. Hundreds of peasants were raped, tortured and (or) 
murdered outright, many others were taken away, never to be 
3 
heard from again. 
The FSLN hostage-ransom operation referred to incidents 
related to the Christmas time farewell party- organised for 
the American ambassador Turner Shelton by a wealthy business-
man Jose Castillo Quant on 27 December, 1974; a party to 
which all potentates of the Somoza dynasty were also called. 
2 During their long domination of Nicaragua, the Somozas 
accrued massive holdings in virtually every sector of the 
economy. By 1956, when Anastasio Somoza Garcia was 
killed, the family was worth $ 50 million. By the time 
Anastasio Jr. was 'elected' a decade later, the fortune 
was tripled to $ 150 million. At the time of the 1972 
earthquake, it was commonly estimated at $ 300 m. And 
when Somoza was overthrown, he was believed to have been 
worth well in excess of half a million dollars. 
T.W.Walker, n.l, p.19. 
3 The Republic of Nicaragua i An Amnesty Report,(London; 
Amnesty International Publications, 1977), p.31, 
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Shortly after the guest of honour departed, the Sandinistas, 
under Eduardo Contreras Escobar, rushed in and seized 40 of 
the guests, including the mayor of Managua and the ambassador 
to the united States. These persons were then held as 
hostages until the Sandinistas, through the mediation of the 
archbishop, received $ 5 million, 15 political prisoners, 
and a flight to Havana. The Managua raid was followed by 
steppedup activity by the PSLN throughout the remote 
provinces, especially in Zelaya, using techniques learned 
in Cuba to win the peasantry. 
In November 1976, the FSLN was dealt two stunning 
blows. While Eduardo Escobar was killed in November in a 
Managua shootout with Guardia, FSLN Secretary General 
Carlos Fonseca Amador and his Mexican lieutenant Julio 
Tirade Lopez, were ambushed and killed by the Guardia the 
very next day. This led to the influential publication 
Latin America to declare the Sandinistas 'virtually 
— ^ 
eliminated' as a threat. The Sandinistas continued to 
make occasional forays throughout 1977, but these were 
viewed as nothing but ' a tiny hit and xrun campaign designed 
to attract international publicity. It was also declared 
that the PSLN ceased to be a threat to Somoza. 
A problem that confronted the FSLN at this stage was 
its internal strife. In 1975, a quarrel developed between 
those who favoured a long drawn guerrilla war and those who 
7 
favoured a sudden, mass insurrection. A group led by 
4 Thomas P.Anderson, Politics in Central America, (New 
York : praeger Publishers, 1982}, p.156. 
5 Latin America, 26 November, 1976, 
6 penny Lernox, . 'The Somozas of Nicaragua', The Nation, 
23 July, 1978, pp. 72-77. 
7 The former was called the Guerra Prolongada Popular (GPP) 
and the latter, the Proletarian tendency. 
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Victor Manuel Tirado Lopez, and the brothers Daniel and 
Humberto Ortega tried to mediate between the other tvjo 
tendencies and ended up by forming their own, appropriately 
called the terceristas, which had the reputation of being 
more moderate than the others and of being linked to the 
8 progressive business community in Managua. 
r 
With the FSLN in disarray, Somoza's fortunes appeared 
to have revived. Early in January, he reshuffled his 
cabinet to make it more effective. But on the 10th of the 
Same month, his henchman committed an act of folly that went 
a long way towards bringing the Somoza house down. It 
involved Pedro Joaquin Chamorrc, the son of parents from 
two of the most powerful of old conservative families. As 
the publisher of the respected newspaper. La Prensa, he was 
a perpetual thorn in the sole of the government. Several 
times in the past, Chamorro had engaged in armed insurrection 
against the Somozas, but each time he had been pardoned and 
allowed to return to Managua. The Somozas, however, 
hated him, and none with more vehemence than Tachito, the 
heir apparent. The immediate cause of the anger was a 
series of La Pi^ ensa articles about Plasmaferesis, the 
Somoza-owned comnercial blood plasma operation through which 
Somoza sold the blood of his people to the US. Several 
cars filled with Guardia surrounded the vehicle of 
Chamorro as he drove along a street in the rubble strewn 
old centre of Managua. They forced him to the curb and 
9 
shot him point blank. 
While Somoza tried to pin the blame on Pedro Ramos, 
president of Plasmaferesls , Nicaraguans suspected a more 
8 Latin America Political Report, 29 December, 1978. 
9 Thomas P. Anderson, n.4, p.157. 
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direct Somoza connection with the killing. Thirty thotiaand 
people joined Chamorro's funeral procession and widespread 
'rioting broke out. Various factions, each representing a 
particular interest, now combined for a general strike under 
the leadership of the Union Democratica de Liberacion 
(UDEL) . The purpose of the strike was to force Somoza's 
resignation which was also called for by Rene Sandino 
Aguelo, the then head of the Conservative Party. The 
general strike, after considerable violence and Government 
repression, petered out in the first week of February 1978, 
but the forces it had unleashed continued to work. 
The murder of Chamorro and the subsequent general 
strike served to revive the morale of the Sandinistas, who 
launched in July a series of attacks against the Guardia in 
Jinotepe, then in Masaya and San Marcos. Heavy fighting 
Was also reported along the Costa Rican border, the chief 
route of FSLN infiltration into the country. On 20 July 
came the most brazen attack, when a lone Sandinista checked 
into an Intercontinental Hotel room facing La Loma, and 
fired two rockets toward the newly completed bunker that 
Somoza had dug into the fortress. Angered by the ineffec-
tiveness of the National Guard, Somoza sacked 35 officers, 
including Alesio Guiterrez, the chief of the Managua 
police department. 
But more was to come. On 22nd August, 25 Sandinistas 
disguised as Guardia members seized the National Palace, 
10 These included the Consejo Superior de la Empresa 
Privada (COSEP) representing business and manufactur-
ing interests, and the confederation General de 
Trabajo Independiente (CGTI) and the Central de 
Trabajadores de Nicaragua (CTN), two powerful unions. 
11 Thomas P. Anderson, n.4, p.157. 
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where the legislature was in session and rounded up 70 
hostages including Interior Minister Jose Antonio Mora and 
Luis pallais. The leader of the guerrillas, Eden Pastora, 
then negotiated through archibishop Obando, the release 
of more than 60 political prisoners and a ransom of half 
a million dollars. After 48 hours of tense negotiations, 
the guerrillas, the released prisoners, and the money, 
along with Luis Pallais and Somoza's nephew Jose Sojnoza 
Abrego were flown to Panama. It was. a master stroke, 
crippling the prestige of the Somozas. Even nvore important, 
one of the released prisoners was the inplacable Tomas Borge 
Martinez, who had been imprisoned and tortured for over a 
year, in an effort to turn him into a 'human vegetable'. 
He became the nemesis of the Somoza family and the driving 
force in the effort of his GPP tendency, the prolonged-
12 popular-war faction of the FSLN. In the wake of these 
events, there was an attempted coup by some officers of the 
Guardia, 35 of whom were arrested. 
In September, President Carter's troubleshooter William 
Jordan, visited the country and conducted talks with Somoza 
13 
and with the new united opposition, the FAO. Alfonso 
Robelo, a leader of COSEP and organiser of the general strike 
of January and February, was considered the spokesman of 
the FAO. Jordan tried to arrive at some compromise between 
the FAD and Somoza, but failed, for the PAD insisted that 
12 Ibid., pp.158. Also see, for a history of the insurrec-
tion, Ricardo Chavarria, 'The Insurrection', in T.W.Walker, 
(edited), Nicaragua in Revolution, (New York : Praeger 
Publishers, 1982), pp. 41-68. 
13 This opposition had coalesced, after the general 
strike, into the FAD (Frento Amplico de Oposicion), 
composed of 16 organisations, including three labour 
unions, four factions of the Conservative party, two 
socialist parties, the independent liberal party Los Doce 
(or the Twelve), and a new political party, the ADN. 
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Somoza must go and that the Guard!a must be disbanded, 
along with the puppet Congress. In November,William 
Bowdler of the State Department, came down on a similar 
mission, along with officials from Guatemala and Dominican 
Republic, but again there was no compromise between the 
demands of the opposition and the determination of Somoza 
14 
to finish the term. 
While the talks were on, civil war began in earnest. 
On 10 September, the Sandinistas temporarily abandoned 
hit-and-run warfare and seized the northern city of Esteli. 
The Guardia, with superior firepower, reduced the city to 
rubble in retaking it by the end of the month. But heavy 
fighting also broke out in Leon, where only ths 'cuartel' 
remained in govemmen:. hands until a relief force drove out 
the Sandinistas. Masaya was,like Esteli, destroyed in a 
bitter siege. In addition to combat, there was a series of 
specific and general strikes, beginning in August, that 
15 
effectively crippled the economy. 
Soon however, a power struggle emerged within the 
opposition, with Alfonso Robelo on the one hand and Adolfo 
Calero Porto Carrero, the head of Coca Cola Bottling and 
a Somoza in-law, who had just been released from prison, on 
the other. Calero, who expected favour from the United 
States in becoming the next president, suggested a plebiscite 
to help determine the will of the Nicaraguan people. With 
the possibility of an FAD compromise becoming apparent, two 
factions of the front withdrew support, Somoza took advantage 
14 Somoza had vowed tor stay on until 1981, when he would, 
in his own words, 'hand over the Presidency to the 
Republic and the leadership of the Guardia and go home 
like any other liberal'. Richard Millet, Guardians 
of Dynasty, (New York : Orbis, 1977), p,63. 
15 Thomas p. Anderson, n,4, p.159. 
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of these cracks within the oppositidn by announcing that he 
would go along with the FAD demands for an end of censorship, 
an amnesty for political prisoners, and an end of the state 
of siege,•'•^  While the Calero faction hailed this, Robelo 
and some others refused to consider this as any real 
victory. Henceforth, the FAO began to be left behind as 
more radical coalitions were formed. Washington still 
appeared to pin its hopes on the FAO and urged Somoza to 
go ahead with the plebiscite plan proposed by Calero but in 
January, the dictator suddenly made a volte face, categori-
cally rejected the plan, and announced his intention to 
increase the size of the Guardia, 
To replace the moribund FAO, some 20 political and 
union groups formed the Movimiento Pueblo Union (MPU), which 
subsequently became the Frente Patriotico Nacional (FPN) with 
links to the FSLN. Around the same time, in March 1979, 
FSLN founder Tomas Borge announced in Havana that the three 
major factions had settled their differences and were 
creating what was called a National Directorate, consisting 
of nine members. 
In the midst of all this confusion of parties and 
coalitions, the US appeared unable to develop a coherent 
policy. While in June 1978 President Carter went about 
praising Somoza's latest human rights record, in fall, he 
saw to it that the IMF held up a loan of $ 65.7 million 
that Somoza desperately needed, in an effort to get him 
agree to the plebiscite proposal,^® With the rejection of 
16 Ibid, 
17 Havana Radio distributed the announcement of the 
unified directorate at the end of March with a state-
ment by Borge acknowledging the past internal differences 
18 Thomas P, Anderson, n,4, p.160. 
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t h i s idea on 15, January, the United S ta tes in ear ly February, 
cut off a l l aid, though much tha t was in the p ipe l ine 
continued to get through. 
Surpr is ingly enough, the IMF f i na l l y del ivered half 
of the loan money in June - - j u s t in time for Somoza t o 
take i t i n to e x i l e . The US ambassador Mauricio Solaun, 
a Cuban-born scholar who was not a profess ional diplomat, 
was confused by the political situation, disturbed by the 
19 
violence and forced to carry out an unrealistic policy. 
He left in March, with Frank Tucker taking over charge. 
Not until June 7 did the dynamic Lawrence pezzulo arrive 
to assume the ambassadorship. Further, despite whatever 
signals were being sent by the US Executive Branch, Somoza 
had powerful friends in the Congress, including John 
20 
Murphy, a West Point class mate. Delegations of conser-
vative Congressmen from the US continued to make fact-
finding tours of the embattled country, and to find that 
21 
'Somoza was our only hope against a Communist takeover.' 
In April 1979, the GPA tendency launched an offensive 
in the Esteli region but were driven out. The main centre 
of fighting then shifted southward to Leon, Chinandega and 
the Costa Rican border, where the Sandinistas, enjoying 
both overt and covert support of the governments of Costa 
pica and Panama, operated with impunity. The FSLN announced 
the start of a final offensive on 20 May, and captured 
Jinotega the same day, but yet again the firepower of the 
Guardia proved to be too great and they were driven out. 
19 Ibid. 
20 For Murphy's role in seeking to prevent Somoza's down-
fall. See Shirley Christian, Nicaragua - Revolution in 
the Family, (New York : Random House, 1985), pp. 102-03, 
21 Thomas p. Anderson, n.4, p.160. 
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A similar operation took place at Masaya, southeast of 
Managua with the same result. In fact, from the time of. 
the Esteli attack until the end of June there were almost 
continual fighting in a number of large and small towns 
of the north and west. 'They were taken, retaken, abandoned 
by both sides until several were a mass of ruins, weak and 
22 
ripe to fall.* 
Sorooza retreated to his bunker and prepared for an 
all out war, Alfonso Robelo and several other leaders of 
both the FAO and the MPU were thrown into prison. Right-
wing death squads on the Guatemalan pattern operated freely, 
and, in a particularly brutal incident. Conservative leader 
Alfonso Gonzalez, and his son and nephew, both 12 years 
old were gunned down at their Managua home by the Guardia, 
along with the household servants. His wife Constancia 
fled to the Mexican Embassy. The televised murder of ABC 
23 
newsman William Stewart in June also hurt Somoza's cause. 
Although the Sandinistas lost most of their battles, ' 
they were in fact winning the war. The brutality of the 
government was forcing many who, like Robelo^had once vowed 
never to cooperate with them, into their camp. Help from 
abroad was coming not only from Costa Rica and Panama, but 
also from the Andean Pact countries of Venezuela, Colombia, 
24 Peru, Ecaudor, and Bolivia, as well as from Mexico. Scxnoza 
did, of course, enjoy the backing of the southerncone 
dictatorships and of his fellow Central American conserva-
tive regimes, but this backing was not very substantial. 
With the arrival of Ambassador Pezzulo, even the United 
States appeared to have turned against him, 
22 Shirley Christian, n.20, p.110, 
23 Thomas P. Anderson, no.4, p.161. 
24 Shirley Christian, n.20, pp. 101-11, 
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Early in June, the Sandinistas began to infiltrate into 
Managua, and on the 8th they launched their offensive in the 
capital, seizing barrios both east and west of the central 
zone. Although the Government was taken by surprise, Scmioza 
ordered a counter-attack; tanks and armoured cars turned their 
guns upon the city, along with artillery, planes bombed and 
strafed, and even helicopters were loaded with 500 pound 
bombs which were rolled out of the doors into houses and 
25 factories below. The Guardia managed to regain control 
of the western barrios in a week, but the eastern sections 
of Managua remained in the hands of the Sandinistas until 
27 June, when they conducted an orderly retreat under cover 
of darknes^s, some 12 miXes to Masaya, which then became 
their headquarters. 
The retreat to Masaya had been in fact only a tactical 
withdrawal. Prom there,the Sandinistas fanned out to 
Surround the capital, pinning the Guardia against Lake 
Managua. The encirclement was completed with the fall of 
Jinotepe, on July 5, The only way in or out of the capital 
then was by Las Mercedes Airport, some six miles east of 
the city. The Sandinistas could have taken it at will, but 
they allowed it to remain in Government hands, perhaps as 
a means of escape for Somoza and his cronies so that 
26 
another assault and pitched battle might be avoided. Fight-
ing continued to rage in other areas of the country near 
the Costa Rican border with the Guardia under the redoubtable 
Maj.Jose Emilio Salazar, while Esteli was still being 
27 
contested in the northwest. 
25 Thomas P. Anderson, n.4, p.161* 
26 Ibid., p.162. 
27 Ma j .Sa l aza r , who was Somoza's s t a r combat l e a d e r , l e d 
j o u r n a l i s t s , t o t h e reg ion and showed off cap tu red r i f l e s , 
r o c k e t s , machine-guns and thousands of rounds of ammu-
n i t i o n . He claimed t h a t i t was f i r s t v i c t o r y the Guardia 
had eve r won in c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e . S h i r l e y 
C h r i s t i a n , n . 2 0 , p . 1 1 4 . 
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Smel l ing v i c t o r y , the S a n d i n i s t a d i r e c t o r a t e named a 
government in e x i l e , c o n s i s t i n g of a five-member j u n t a . Two 
members of the j u n t a were n o n - m a r x i s t s : Alfonso Robelo and 
V i o l e t a B a r r i o s de chamorro, widow of t h e mar tyred Pedro 
J o a q u i n , bu t t h e o t h e r t h r e e were drawn from t h e S a n d i n i s t a 
l e a d e r s h i p . Serg io Ramirez, a r e c e n t c o n v e r t t o the PSLN, 
the Marx i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l Dan ie l Ortega Saavedra , and Moises 
Hassan. The Uni ted S t a t e s d id no t approve of t h e M a r x i s t 
m a j o r i t y on t h e new j u n t a and Will iam Bowdler was d i s p a t c h e d 
t o t r y and persuade the FSLN t o broaden the base of t h e 
j u n t a . Even such North American l i b e r a l s as Edward Kennedy 
were c a l l i n g fo r 'any measure t o p r e v e n t t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of 
28 
a Marx is t regime in Nica ragua . • But the response was 
t h a t by i n c l u d i n g the MDN l e a d e r and a prominent c o n s e r v a t i v e , 
the S a n d i n i s t a s had a l r e a d y bent over backward t o c r e a t e a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body. They p o i n t e d out t h a t the persons 
sugges ted by the US.Adolfo C a l e r o , G e n . J u l i o G u i t e r r e z of 
the Guard ia , Emi l io Alvarez ( C o n s e r v a t i v e ) , E r n e s t o 
Fernendez (a L i b e r a l f r i e n d of Somoza), Mariana F i a l l o s , 
ano the r L i b e r a l . a n d Conse rva t ive Jaime Chamorro of La Prensa -• 
would g ive the o l d e r o r d e r a dominant vo ice and be s imply 
'Somocismo wi thou t Somoza'. 
While Bowdler t r i e d t o b a r g a i n wi th t h e S a n d i n i s t a s , 
P e z z u l l o Was i n t e n t on e f f e c t i n g Somoza*s d e p a r t u r e . In 
t h i s he had a f irm a l l y in Archbishop Obando, who was doing 
e v e r y t h i n g p o s s i b l e t o d i s c r e d i t t he regime and persuade the 
Americans t o accept t he i n e v i t a b l e FSLN v i c t o r y . So a c t i v e 
was the a rchbishop t h a t Somoza was rumoured t o have made 
•?. vow t h a t i f he were forced t o f l e e , h i s l a s t a c t could be t o 
shoot 'Commandante M i g u e l i t o . , as he s t y l e d the a r c h i b i s h o p . ^ ^ 
28 Richard M i l l e t , n . l 4 , p . 2 4 1 . 
29 Thomas P.Anderson, n . 4 , p .162 , 
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In the end, however, Pezzullo's 'jawboning' had the desired 
effect and a new assault on the capital was avoided. 
On the night of Monday, 16 July 1979, Somoza agreed 
to go into exile in Flor^ ida with his entire entourage, includ-
ing his mistress Dinora Sampson. He would leave behind, 
as interim president, Francisco Urcuyo, the president of 
the lower house, to turn over power to the victorious 
Sandinistas. He then drove to the airport early in the 
morning of Tuesday, 17 July and left Nicaragua forever. 
For days before his actual departure, the handwriting 
had been on the wall. Bands of demoralised Guardia roamed 
the streets of the capital, mostly very young boys and 
old reservists, shooting at random and terrorising the 
populace. At the Inter-Continental, where members of the 
Congress were kept, distraught women wept, men held 
futile political discussions and street urchins wandared 
about selling bottles of pilfered wine and spirits in a scene 
reminiscent 
was ending. 
of the fall of Saigon. Plainly, a whole world 
To add the ultimate touch to the confusion just after 
Somoza*s departure, Urcuyo had the strange notion that he 
could manage to stay on until the expiry of Somoza*s term 
in 1981. It is quite possible that Somoza himself, as a 
last malicious gesture, had inspired this, but no sooner 
was it cOTununicated to Pezzullo than a furious flurry of 
messages rushed back and forth between Managua and Washington. 
Having failed to convince the Sandinistas, to broaden the 
junta, the United States had at last decided to cut its 
losses and go along with the inevitable triumph of the FSLN. 
30 Ibid., p.163. 
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Urcuyo's announcement thjrew everything out of joint. Frc«n 
Washington, a high official of the State Department was 
said to have put through a call to Sonoza in Florida, warning 
him that if Urcuyo stayed on, he would be immediately 
deported. Reluctantly, perhaps, Somoza sent out the 
necessary word, and the new president resigned, having been 
•king for 36 hours*, as was said on Salvadorean radio. 




SUPER POWER INVOLVEMENT : CONSTRAXWIS AND 
SUCCESSES 
US influence in Nicaragua has been strong and pervasive 
since time iromeroorial. But this needs to be examined in 
the light of certain principles of US foreign policy formu-
lated befoire and during the age of Latin American indepen-
dence. With the breakup of the Spanish colonial empire, 
the US had,for the first^time to evolve a policy towards 
its neighbours, which took account of the fact that they 
too were becoming independent. In the Monroe Doctrine 
formulated in 1823, the principle of reciprocity was 
maintained; it was understood at the outset by the newly 
enfranchised Latin American States as a defensive movement 
in their favour rather than a step taken by the US in its 
own interest and for its own self-defense. 
The US under the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine, 
would not interfere with existing colonies. Just as it 
would not interfere in the affairs of Europe itself. It 
would, however, oppose the reconquest by European powers. 
of territories seelcing to assexrt their independence, and 
even more, any transfer of colonies in the New World between 
European powers. This latter provision owed much of its 
in^etus to a contestable, "alarm caused by reports that 
Russian sailors were moving southwards from Alaska along 
the coast of Upper California and hence might herald an 
attempt to annex this region before the independence of 
2 
Mexico could be consolidated." 
1 This reciprocity envisaged the need not to interfere in 
the affairs of Europe, if the US itself was to be left 
alone. 
2 pe ter Calvert , "The Future US ro le in Latin America", 
In ternat iona l Journal , Toronto* 1981-82, XXXVII(l), p.77# 
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In the Monroe Doctrine as it came to be regarded later 
both in the USA and in Latin America, future generations 
came to interpret the words written by John Quincy Adams 
both as an assertion of a tutelary role for the US over 
the emerging Latin American states and as an obligation 
upon these states to accept it. The latter delusion — 
product of the heady rush to power of USA at the end of 
the 19th century — was recognised as such at the end of 
the 1920s and publicly renounced by President F.D.Roosevelt's 
statement of the Good Neighbour policy. In the meanwhile, 
however, it had played its part in creating the paradox 
that the US,from its origin and by predilection a strongly 
anti-imperialist power, had itself acquired a small but 
3 
lioticeable empire. 
By 1927, US Under Secterary of State, Robert Olds 
declared, as a principle established by the Monroe Doctrine 
and reinforced through 'logic' and 'long-practice' that 
Central America was a legitimate sphere of influence of the 
USA, He stated that "Central America has always understood 
that governments we recognise and support stay in power, 
while those which we do not... fall. Nicaragua has become 
a test case..." 
In 1927 itself with US Marines occupying Nicaragua, 
Walter Lippmann, a foreign policy analyst, remarked that "all 
the world thinks of.the US today as an empire, except the 
people of the 'United States.,, To admit that we have an 
empire still seems to most Americans like adioitting that 
they have gone out into a wicked world and there lost their 
3 Ibid. 
4 Robert S. Leiken and Barry Rubin (edited), Central 
American Crisis Reader (New York : Summit Books, 1987), 
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their political chastity". The United States of America 
emerged from an anti-colonial struggle for 'life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness' ~ what are now referred to as 
'human rights'. Yet as the USA grew into a great industrial 
and military power, it acquired what the rest of the world, 
and definitely Latin Americans, regard as an empire. 
In fact, throughout most of the twentieth century* the 
United States exercised unchallenged hegemony in the region 
and monopolised foreign intervention. The route to 
dominance was nearly always smoothed by US illusions of 
assisting 'free elections', democracy/ and the formation of 
'non-partisan' armies. However, for Central America, the 
results were usually military dictatorships. 
In the 1920s, on behalf of 'free elections' and against 
a supposed 'Bolshevik threat' emanating from revolutionary 
Mexico, the United States created in Nicaragua a 'nonpartisan 
professional army' (the National Guard) and led it into 
battle against the Mexico-backed guerrillas of August Sandino. 
The united States furnished military equipment, combat 
officers, and trainers as well as roads, medical care, and 
the inevitable electrol apparatus, and helped 
establish Somoza's dictatorship. In F.D. Roosevelt's own 
5 The American expansion to the Pacific Coast was achieved 
through land grants as also by force. In general, however, 
economic, political and financial rather than military 
coercion was«preferred. The apparent invisibility of these 
methods, the American anticolonial heritage and the 
relative openness of their political process made it both 
suitable and necessary to present the American acquisi-
tions as something other than empire. See Robert S.Leiken 
and Barry Rubin, n.4, p.27, 
6 For an excellent history of early US-Nicaraguan relations. 
See Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty. (New York : 
Orbls, 1977), ^ ^—'-*—^ 
7 Robert S.Leiken and Barry Rubin, n.4, p.28, 
7 
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words, Somoza was 'our son of a bitch.* Two generations 
of Nicaraguans thus came to draw the conclusion that America's 
talk of democracy and posture of innocence abroad was little 
more than a Trojan horse for hegemony. 
For the State Department/ these efforts were part of 
the struggle of "democracy vs barbarism", as Olds put it. 
"The mission of civilising the savage was deeply rooted in 
our history". It was a tradition that ignored social and 
historical conditions of the "barbarians'*. As Octavio Paz 
writes, 'when the US abandons its isolation and participates 
in the affairs of the world, it does so in the manner of a 
9 
believer in a land of infidels.' 
American military interference and political engineer-
ing left a legacy of distrust and anti-Americanism. The 
consequences have been twofold: an increasing desire on the 
part of Latin American countries to establish foreign policy 
agendas separate and even opposfed to that of the United 
States; and a susceptibility in certain sectors of Latin 
America to Soviet influence under the initial assumption 
that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. The emergence 
of the four-nation Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama 
and Venezuela) and the Lima Support Grot^ (Peru, Brazil, 
Argentina and Uruguay) , "which has sought a regional settle-
ment for the Central American conflict, is a manifestation 
of the first tendency. The pro-Soviet proclivities of the' 
Sandinistas are an example of the second. 
8 Though the phrase was commonly associated with Somoza, 
the epithet originally referred to Rafael Trujillo, the 
military ruler of the Dominican Republic frcwn 1930-1961. 
9 Octavio Paz, One Earth, Four or Five Worlds, (San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace Johanovich, 1985), p.50. 
10 Robert S, Leiken and Barry Rxobin, n.4, p.29. 
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Today, the Soviet Union and its Cuban allies have gained 
a foothold in Latin America and seek to spread their 
influence via Nicaragua. At the same time the US feels that 
it has legitimate national security concerns in the region, 
interests which have allegedly been put in jeopardy by 
Soviet/Cuban hegemonic ambitions. 
The US foreign policy approach towards Central America 
derives primarily from a perception of the geo-stratcgic 
importance of the region. Traditional views of American 
strategic interests in Central America en^hasise on an 
inventory of national security, economic and geo-political 
interests. Protection of these vital interests has been 
justification for US intervention in the domestic affairs 
of countries located within the region on more than one 
occasion. Indeed, the current phase of US interventionism, 
in which Central America has become a major theatre of East-
West tensions, is justified by recourse to traditional 
articulation of US strategic interests. 
Addressing the Sub-Committee of Inter-American Affairs 
of the House of Representatives, M.Peter McPhereson, 
Administrator of the Agency for International Development 
reiterated these views: The geographic proximity of Latin 
America and the Caribbean has a direct bearing on our 
national security. Our vital concerns in the region 
include unimpeded use of the sea lanes adjacent to North 
America and the Panama Canal, and continued access to oil from 
12 Venezuela, Mexico and other exporters in the hemisphere. 
11 Robert Henriques Girling and Luin Goldring, 'US Strategic 
Interests in Central America; The Economics and Geo-
politics of Empire', in the Stanford Central America 
Action Network (edited), Revolution in Central America. 
(Colorado; Westview, 1983) , p. 187. — 
12 M.peter McPhereson, Testimony before Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs, House 
of Representatives, December 15, 1981, 
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Moreover/ McPhereson cited the economic significance 
of the Latin American region in purchasing "nearly $ 39 
billion of US exports* making them the second largest 
market for our products, topped only by Western Europe". 
He went on to say that "Seventy percent of all US foreign 
direct and financial investment in the developing world is 
in Latin America and the Carribbean,.. We depend on the 
region for significant shares of several iirqportant raw 
materials and other commodities such as bauxite and alumina, 
coffee, sugar and petroleum," Central America is thus seen 
as vital to the integrity of the entire Caribbean Basin which 
stretches from the island economies of the Caribbean 
through Mexico to Venezuela and Colombia. 
Strategic interests include security interests in the 
region, the strategic military corridor through which 
one-half of US oil imports pass and the economic mineral 
resources —• petroleum, aluminivon and nickel — that are 
situated in the region; resouixes which generate four 
13 dollars for every one dollar of invested capital. To 
protect these assets, the traditional views of US interests 
have stressed one over-riding concern — innoculation of the 
region against any regime potentially hostile to the US or 
US business interests. 
An alternative view of US interests in the region, 
however, questions the security and economic value of the 
region. US security interests were seriously questioned 
by Abraham Lowenthal, Director of the Latin American Programme 
at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington, D.c. in 1981. 
He said: 
13 Robert Henrigues Girling and Luin Goldring, n.ll, 
p. 187, 
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"If we are r e a l l y honest about the s i t u a t i o n 
and think about the cont ingenc ies in which the 
use of US m i l i t a r y force might be a p o s s i b i l i t y 
in the Western Hemesphere, they would not be 
to pro tec t aga ins t threa t s to v i t a l US s e c u r i t y 
a s s e t s , (but) rather t o shore up beleaguered 
regimes, such as we see now in Central America . . . 
As (to) s t r a t e g i c and other m a t e r i a l s , Latin 
America's r e l a t i v e importance as a source for 
the US has dropped for roost products as the 
country's i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i n k s have m u l t i p l i e d , 
and as s y n t h e t i c s have i n c r e a s i n g l y come t o be 
u s e d . . . the US no longer depends on Latin 
America for any commodity, as i t does on South 
Africa and the S o v i e t Union for chrome and 
plat inium."14 
Moreover, the d i r e c t economic s i g n i f i c a n c e of Latin 
America and the Caribbean has been d e c l i n i n g in terms of 
15 d i r e c t foreign investment and p o l i t i c a l support. There are, 
'however, some a s s e t s of considerable value t o the US located 
in Central America. The Panama Canal i s a v i t a l commercial 
and m i l i t a r y l ink to Latin America and Europe. S t r a t e g i c 
ana lys t s argue that any adverse course of events in the 
region could have deterimental consequences upon these v i t a l 
a s s e t s . 
Nicaragua, like Cuba, was victimised early in the 
century by the new 'Manifest Destiny' which guided US hemis-
pheric policy during those years. It became a virtual 
protectorate of the United States in 1912 when the Marines 
were dispatched, ostensibly to protect American property 
and citizens during a period of civil strife. 
But the USA soon enough, turned Nicaragua into its 
fief, exercising direct control of its customs, railways 
14 Abraham Lowenthal testimony, US National Interest in 
Latin America, Hearing before Sub-Committee on Inter-
American Affairs, March 1981, 
15 Robert H. Girling and Luin Goldring, n.ll, p.188. 
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and the National Bank, while the coun t ry ' s mines, p l a n t a -
t a t i on and fo re s t resources were owned by American companies. 
The government, the m i l i t a r y barracks and a l l cofflmunications 
were under the cont ro l of the US Marines. As i f t h i s were 
not enough, in re turn for t h r e e mi l l ion d o l l a r ^ , Nicaragua 
was forced to sign the Bryan-Chamarro Treaty on August 5, 
1914, under which Nicaragua granted the US, in pe rpe tu i ty 
and free of any payment', the r i g h t t o exclusive t i t l e 
necessary for the cont ruc t ion , operation and maintenance of 
a canal along the Rio San Juan-Great Lake l i n e , or along 
any o ther l i ne on Nicaraguan t e r r i t o r y . The Treaty a l so 
s t i p u l a t e d t h a t in order to f a c i l i t a t e the defence of the 
Panama Canal by the United S ta tes government and for the 
purpose of implementing the r i g h t s agreed upon, as well 
as of f a c i l i t a t i n g any measure e s s e n t i a l for the r e a l i s a t i o n 
of the envisaged ob jec t ives , Nicaragua lease t o the United 
S t a t e s , for a period of ninety-nine years , the Great Corn 
and L i t t l e Com Is lands in the Caribbean Sea, and recognised 
also for the same per iod, the r igh t of the US t o bu i ld and 
mantain a naval base on tha t par t of Nicaraguan t e r r i t o r y 
lying on Fonseca Bay, which the US government would choose. 
In f ac t , US i n t e r e s t in Nicaragua, l i k e most of Centra l 
America, was pr imar i ly s t r a t e g i c . Considered for a time 
as a poss ib le s i t e for a canal across the isthmus, 
Nicaragua 's locat ion remained s t r a t e g i c a l l y important for 
defence of the canal in Panama. American con t ro l over the 
customs houses of Nicaragua was es tab l i shed less to insure 
the loans of US bankers than those of Europeans, whose 
16 Angelo Col leoni , US In te rven t ions - A Brief History (New 
Delhi : S t e r l i n g , 1984), p .103 . Also see Thomas L. 
Karnes, 'The H i s t o r i c a l Legacy and the Fa i lure of Union' 
in Howard J.Wiarda ( ed i t ed ) . Rif t and Revolution 
(Washington: American Enterpr i se I n s t i t u t e of Publ ic 
Pol icy Research, 1984), p .42 . 
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potential for interventions the US perceived as a strategic 
threat, 
T^e Panama Canal is the sine qua non in the realm of 
Caribbean geo-politics. Each year some 12 % of US-seaborce 
coninerce traverses the isthmus. The cargo inclxides a third 
of corn and phosphate exports, approximately one quarter 
of US coal eacports, and 15 % of grain exports. Militarily, 
the canal is considered to be essential to the defence of 
Europe in the event of a prolonged war. The importance of 
the Canal to the US as a military training site cannot also 
be discounted. Nevertheless despite these facts, the 
economic importance of the Canal is said to be on the wane 
since the 1960s. "Built in 1914, the present canal can 
accoiranodate ships of upto 56,000 dead weight tons. It is 
now more economical to use larger ships upto 250,000 dwt — 
even if it means going round Cape Horn» according to the 
19 international shipping industry," US foreign policy 
formulators, however, still believe that the entire Central 
American region is important to the defence of Mexico 
and Brazil; it is strategically important due to its 
symbolic value, in showing the world * that the US has stopped 
20 
abandoning even its pockmarked friends.' 
17 William M. Leo Grande, *The Revolution in Nicaragua. 
Another Cuba?*, Foreign Affairs, Fall# 1979, and also 
see Margaret Daley Hayes, 'US Security Interests in 
central America, in M.D. Hayes (edited). Central 
America ; International Dimensions of the Crisis,(New 
York : Holmes and Meir, 1982). 
18 US Congress House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, 
US Interests in the Panama Canal Hearings, 95-1, July 
25-27, 1977, p.711, 
19 "A New Way Around the Old Canal', World Business Weekly, 
October 5, 1981, p.8 ^ 
20 W. Scott Thompson, 'Choosing to Win', Foreign Policv. 
Summer,1981, p.83, ^ Si-i^ y* 
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Except for a brief interlude in 1925-26, US troops 
remained in Nicaragua until 1933. The second occupation 
never really managed to- pacify Nicaragua. August 
Sandino refused to accept the imposition of a Conservative 
president in the country and for nearly six years he 
fought a guerrilla war against the Marines, achieving 
international stature as a nationalist and anti-intperialist. 
When the US withdrew under the banner of P.D.Roosevelt's 
Good Neighbourism, it left the task of ensuring stability 
to the American-trained National Guard under the command 
21 
of Anastasio Somoza Garcia. One of Somoza's first 
achievements was to lure the legendary Sandino to Managua 
on the pretext of arranging peace, only to have him 
assassinated. In 1936, Somoza forced the civilian president 
from office, arranged his own election and thus began a 
family dynasty which ruled Nicaragua for 43 years. 
The Somozas carefully cultivated the friendship of 
the united States. This was accomplished through personal 
as well as political means. On the personal plane, all 
of the Somozas were educated in the US, spoke fluent English, 
could turn on US mannerisms at will and were skilled at 
22 
manipulating Americans. At the same time, in the realm of 
international politics, the Somozas were always obsequiously 
'pro-American'. The enemies of the US were automatically 
their enemies, be they the Axis powers during World War II, 
or the Communists thereafter. Accordingly, Nicagaruan 
territory was used by th6 United States for military bases 
during World War II and for the training of CIA surrogate 
21 Richard Miliett, n.6, p.251, 
22 T.W. Walker (edited), Nicaragua in Revolution (New York 
Praeger, 1982), p.16. 
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forces for Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1961) . Nicaragua!) 
troops joined the US forces in the occupation of the 
Dominican Republic in 1965 and were offered, but politely 
refused, during the Korean and Vietnam •conflicts'. In 
return, the USA sent ambassadors to Managua who were usually 
enthusiastically friendly to the Soroozas. In addition, 
especially in the 1960s and 1970s, US foreign aid — economic, 
•social* and military — poured into Nicaragua, and more 
members of Stwiosta's National Guard received training in the 
US or at US bases in Panama than was true of any other Latin 
24 American military establishment. 
The United State's involvement in Nicaragua, over and 
above helping Somoza remain at the helm, extended to 
financial investment in the country. US firms like Alberti 
Foods, Booth Fisheries, Hughes Tool Company and the Banco 
de America picked up the crumbs left by the rapacious 
Somozas. The US had come to stay as an ally of Nicaragua; 
though the Somoza dynasty was far from the civilian democracy 
originally envisioned by the United States; it was nonethe-
less stable, pro-American and anti-communist. 
The 1970s however, brought about a qualitative change in 
Somoza*s approach to running the country. The extent of 
corruption, together with the expansion of Somoza*s ecoWdWic 
empire into areas of economic activity previously reserved 
for other members of Nicaragua's bourgeoisie, alienated 
large sectors of both the middle and upper classes who 
had traditionally been at^east the passive accontplices of 
23 Ibid., p.17. 
24 Richard Millett, n.6, p.252, 
25 Thomas P.Anderson, Politics in Central America^ (New 
York : Praeger, 1982), p. 154. 
76 
the dynasty.^^ The 1972 earthquake t h a t destroyed the 
c a p i t a l c i t y of Managua a l s o s t imulated oppos i t ion t o Somoza's 
economic and p o l i t i c a l empire, manifested in the wave of 
s t r i k e s , demonstrations and land s e i z u r e s that swept the 
country during that per iod . Somoza responded t o the 
growing oppos i t ion with p o l i t i c a l r epres s ion . The reign of 
t error v i s i t e d upon Nicaragua by the Nat ional Guard in 1975 
and 1976 appalled Nicaragua's moderates tod earned the 
Somoza Government i n t e r n a t i o n a l opprobrium. I t a l s o made 
Somoza the chief nemesis of human rights advocates in the 
27 US Congress. 
The long history of Somoza*s ties to the US and his 
willingness to cooperate with US policy objectives in the 
hemisphere suggested that Nicaragua might prove especially 
malleable to US influence. Thus, when the Carter Adminis-
tration unveiled its new hximan rights policy in 1977, 
Nicaragua became its principal target, constituting a near 
perfect show case for the policy. The absence of any apparent 
security problem in Nicaragv.a meant that the US policy there, 
unlike policy towards Iran or South Korea., could be safely 
guided by the moral imperative of hximari rights undiluted by 
national and security concerns. Reduction in US ntilitary 
assistance to Nicaragua on human rights grounds emboldened 
Somoza's moderate opponehts, who had historically been 
immobilised by the unflagging US support which the dynasty 
had enjoyed. 
The siibsequent days saw the entire Nicaraguan nation 
26 William M. Leo Grande^ 'The United States and the Nicara-
guan Revolution', in T.w. Walker,(edited),Nicaragua in 





erupting in a paroxysm of violence. And as civil violence 
became more endemic/ US policy was caught in the pull of 
opposing imperatives. Should the US stand by its advocacy 
of human rights and democratic reform in the face of Scsnoza's 
deteriorating political position? Or should human rights be 
subordinated to the political stability long provided by a 
brutal but reliable ally? Complicating this choice was 
the Carter Administration's self-imposed prohibition on 
interventionism in the Hemisphere and uncertainty as to 
whether Sorooza could, in fact, restore order. To some extent, 
differing evaluations of the situation tended to be 
bureaucratically based. The ability of the Administration 
to devise a coherent policy was further diminished by the 
potent "Nicaraguan lobby' in Congress, and its willingness 
to hold unrelated legislation hostage to the Administration's 
actions. This interplay of forces resulted in a policy which 
was more a product of bureaucratic compromise than of a 
clear assessment of US interests. In fa>ct, there was herdly 
any policy at all. 
In April 1977, the US r e s t r i c t e d both m i l i t a r y and 
economic aid to Somoza on hiunan r igh t s grounds; in September, 
the r e s t r i c t i o n s were re laxed . The government* s harsh 
repression of the January 1978 r i o t s sparked by Chamorro's 
a s s a s s i n a t i o n prompted the Americans t o in^ose new r e s t r i c -
t i o n s and seek t o s t a r t a 'dialogue* between Somoza and 
the moderate group among the oppos i t ion . S i x months l a t e r . 
On June 30, 1978, Pres ident Carter sent a l e t t e r t o Somoza 
29 For a d e t a i l e d narration of the events leading t o the 
r e v o l u t i o n , read P h i l i p Wheaton and Yvonne D i l l i n g , 
Nicaragua : A P e o p l e ' s Revolut ion, (Washington D.C. , 
EPICA Task Force, 1980) . 
30 William M, Leo Grande, n ,17, p . 33 . 
ACC No. ^ ^ 
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congratulat ing him on h i s improved human r igh t s recora. 
The l a s t act ion on part of Carter l ed a majority of 
Nicaraguan opposi t ion t o conclude that t h e i r strategfy of 
forcing Somoza's res ignat ion with the he lp of US pressure 
was untenable. Subsequently a broad c o a l i t i o n c o n s i s t i n g 
of both rad ica l and moderate groups of the oppos i t ion was 
formed with the aim of wrest ing power out of Somoza's 
32 h a n d s . " 
The se i zure of the National Palace in August 1978 by 
the FSL.N, followed by a general s t r i k e and at tacks on the 
National Guard captured the popular imaginat ion. Soon, 
these g u e r r i l l a ac t ions sparked mass insurrec t ion in 
Matagalpa, Leon E s t e l i , Chinandega and Grenada — Somo2d 
r e t a l i a t e d by launching an a e r i a l bombing of c i t i e s , and 
summary execut ions . Thus, a f t e r September 1978, th ings 
reached such a pass tha t no compromise that would re ta in 
Sorooza in power appeared p o s s i b l e . 
The s p e c t a c l e of an army waging war aga ins t i t s own 
people and the convic t ion that Sorooza would never be able t o 
res tore p o l i t i c a l s t e t b i l i t y in the country prompted the US 
o f f i c i a l s to think in terms of a re -eva luat ion of i t s p o l i c y . 
Moreover, the FSLNs unexpected s trength and support ra i sed 
the spec tre of an eventual Sandinis ta v i c t o r y unless some 
sor t of a ' p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n ' could ensure a s u c c e s s f u l 
replacement of Sorooza with a moderate government. Prom the 
f a l l of 1978 onwards, the s i n g l e goal of US p o l i c y was t o 
prevent the success ion of an FSLN-dominated government. Under 
31 William M. Leo Grande, n .26 , p . 67. And a l so s e e , 
for the l e t t e r , S h i r l e y C h r i s t i a n , Nicaragua ; Revo-
lu t ion in the Family (New York : Random House, 1985, 
p . 67, 
32 I t was c a l l e d the Frente Aroplio Oposition - FAD* 
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the auspices of the Organisation of American States (OAS), 
the US organised a mediation e f f o r t aimed a t crea t ing an 
• inter im government' composed of the FAO and Sonvoza's 
National Liberal Party; The National Guard would remain 
i n t a c t . The plan envisaged no ro le f o r the PSLN, and the 
33 g u e r r i l l a s denounced i t as Somocismo without Soraoza. 
vnien Sc»noza re jec ted the mediation proposa l s , the US — 
which maintained that the c o l l a p s e of mediation would 
a f f e c t the 'whole range* of i t s r e l a t i o n s with Nicaragua — 
r e t a i l i a t e d , but the r e t a l i a t i o n was l a r g e l y symbolic . 
The four-man m i l i t a r y missioh was withdrawn, and the emba»sly 
s t a f f was cut by h a l f . At the same t ime, however. Represen-
t a t i v e s Charles Wilson (Deinocrat, Texas) and John Murphy 
(Democrat, New York) threatened t o torpedo the Panama 
Canal t r e a t i e s * impleinentation l e g i s l a t i o n i f the Adminis-
34 t r a t i o n moved openly aga ins t Somoza. 
The June 1979 ' f i n a l o f fens ive* of the PSLN and the 
immediate success i t achieved in the countryside served t o 
heighten US fears of an FSLN victoxry and ensured a r e t r e a t 
from the ' n o n r i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t ' low p r o f i l e which character i sed 
US p o l i c y a f t e r the f a i l u r e of mediation e f f o r t s . Addressing 
the OAS on June 22, Secretary of S ta te Cyxrus Vance f i n a l l y 
put the US on record as favouring Sprooza's r e s i g n a t i o n . 1'he 
r e s t of h i s proposa l s , however, did not correspond to the 
r e a l i t i e s in both Nicaragua and the OAS.^^ 
33 William M. Leo Grande, n .26 , p . 67* 
34 William M. Leo Grande, n . l 7 , p . 35. And a l s o see 
Sh ir l ey Chr i s t ian , n .31 , p . 1 2 1 , 
35 Vance Spoke of a "broad-based representa t ive govern-
ment" and an OAS peace-keeping force t o ensure a 
cease fure . I b i d . 
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With an PSLN victory in sight, the US began to seek to 
construct a constitutionalist solution, Somoza would resign 
in favour of a constitutionalist successor who would then 
appoint a council of prominent independent Nicaraguans and 
turn power over to them. The Council would mediate 
between Somoza*s Liberal Party, the National Guard and 
the opposition to create an interim government composed 
of all these forces. The government, with the National 
Guard still intact, would then make preparations for 
elections in 1981.^^ Needless to say, the constitutionalist 
plan collapsed, with the US realising that none of Nicara-
gua's moderates would eridorse or participate in it. 
When the accession of an FSLN-backcd provisional govern-
ment became inevitable, the US strove to negotiate the terms 
of transition in order to minimise FSLN infltience. It 
decided to use two levers ip this context: Somoza woul4 
resign at the US direction and the US would provide massive 
economic aid to a government acceptable to it. In return it 
wanted the induction of two more moderates to the provisional 
Government for National Reconstruction, formed earlier in 
June, and a guarantee that neither Somoza's Liberal Party nor 
37 the National Guard would be dismantled. 
The FSLN was not disposed to accede to these demands. 
despite pressure from several Latin American countries which 
had earlier aided the anti-Somoza opposition. All it agreed 
to was guarantee the lives of Somocistas and National 
Guardsmen, and leave open the possibility for 'honest* members 
3 6 Williafltn M. ieo Grande, n.l7, p.36. T.W.Walker points 
out that the Carter Administration,in the final hours of 
the Somoza regime, tried to bargain, without success, 
with the revolutionaries for the maintenance of the 
National Guard, in a "revised" form after Somoza's 
departure, see T.W. Walker, Nicaragua, The Land of Sandino, 
(Colorado : Westview, 1981) , p.-io, 
37 Ibid. 
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of the Guard to join the new national army. The battlefield 
situation, plus the moderation of the provisional goveen-
ment programme and cabinet, finally left the US with no 
option but to accept the junta's terms. 
On July 17, President Anastasio Somoza Debayle went 
into exile in Miami. With him went the entire sepior comilnand 
of the National Guard, as well as its morale. The Guard 
proceeded to disintegrate ignominously, and within 24 hours 
had ceased to exist. Thus was realised the very eventuality 
which US policy since January 1978 had sought to avoid — 
a con^ jlete Sandinista military victory. 
The failure of American policy cannot be attributed to 
the laclc of a clear policy objective — at least not after 
Chamorro's assessination; nor can it be attributed to the 
internal dynamics of Nicaraguan politics. As William M* Leo 
Grande puts it: 
"AS events unfolded in Nicaragua, the US 
consistently tried to fit a square peg of 
policy into the round hole of reality. By 
failing to assess accurately the dynamics of 
ScxQoza's decline, the US produced proposals 
which were invariably six months out of date. 
When the political initiative lay with the 
moderate opposition, the US acted as if it still 
lay with Somoza. When the initiative shifted 
to the radicals, the US acted as if it lay 
with the moderates. And when, at the last 
moment, the US recognised that the radicals 
held the initiative, it seemed to think it 
could cajole them into returning It to the 
moderates. "38 
In short, this failure was the result of the selective 
perception of policy makers who seemed to believe that Somoza 
38 Ibid,, p.37, 
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could re s tore order long a f t e r that became imposs ib le , that 
the moderates were strong enough t o form a post-Somoza 
regime excluddLng the r a d i c a l s , and f i n a l l y , that the r a d i c a l s 
could be induced to surrender t h e i r l eadersh ip of the 
oppos i t ion on the very threshhold of v i c t o r y . 
THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNtON 
The c r i s i s of the US-backed Central American s ta tus 
quo of fered Moscow an inexpensive opportunity t o confound 
i t s superpower r i v a l . E a r l i e r on, Moscow had v i r t u a l l y 
consigned Central America t o the US sphere of in f luence by 
geographic fa ta l i sm. When t h i s reg ion , l i k e o ther 'back-
yards' of the world, was swept i n t o the vortex of revo lu t ion; 
S o v i e t i n t e r e s t cjuickened. Yet , p r e c i s e l y because t h i s i * 
a US zone of in f luence , Moscow's capac i ty t o pro jec t power 
appeared l i m i t e d . These oppoxrtunities and l i m i t a t i o n s form 
the parameters within which Moscow has had to operate . 
•7 
In the fourteen years between 1965 and 1979, the Soviet 
Union had managed to achieve rough nuclear parity with the US, 
while widening its conventional advantages. Moscow's develop-
ment of a blue-water navy and the rapid strides it made in 
the sphere of logistics made it possible to form a more 
effective 'natural alliance' with many Third World national 
liberation movements, particularly in the light of US 
repudiation of intervention. 
The came period witnessed major changes in Soviet 
tactics. Moscow made it clear that economic ties with the 
Soviet bloc were no longer to be considered as the main 
factor for the 'non-capitalist road of development', it was 
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asserted that 'political military fronts' modelled on 
Fidel Castro's July 26th Movement could play the role 
previously reserved for vanguard Marxist-Leninist parties. 
In other words, in the mid-i970s the main element enqphasised 
was the 'political, military, strategic, and moral infla^nce 
of th0 states of the Socialist community', which translated 
into growing Soviet military and security assistance to 
revolutionary movements ahd 'national revolutionary 
39 governments • 
This shift was a reflection of the widening gap between 
Soviet economic and military performance. Accordingly, in 
dealing with countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam and 
Nicaragua, Moscow recommended the preservation of mixed 
economies and economic ties with the West. At the same time, 
the Kremlin sought over-whelming influence in the military, 
security and intelligence spheres. 
Three factors which are understood to have influenced 
the modification of Soviet policy toward Central America in 
the 1970s were: the favourable 'global correlation of 
forces'^ proven success for the new strategy, and a t^ elpful 
Cuba. It needs to be mentioned, however, that such a shift 
would not have taken place without the existence of 
40 
compatible conditions in Central America. 
In other words, by the 1970s, the Soviet Union and 
Cxiba had arrived at a coherent stratisgic vision with regard 
to the Third World in general and the Caribbean basin in 
particular, according tx) which their actions have been 
orchestrated. After almost a decade of discord, there was 
now an integrated, though flexible, and long term plan of 
39 Robert S. Leiken and Barry Rubin, n.4, p.31. 
40 Ibid. 
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action aimed at achieving specific ideological, political, 
41 
security aild economic objectives. 
Ideology; It would be misleading to assume that Soviets support 
revolutionary movement in the Caribbean basin solely a» part 
42 
of a grand design to create Leninist regimes. Still ideology 
cannot be discounted as one of their greater motives. The 
Soviet Union, after Cuba began to conform to true Leninist 
development, desired that this revolution be emulated by 
other radical regimes in the region. Thus the Leninist incli-
nation of the PSLN regime in Nicaragua could not but be 
appreciated and applauded by the Soviets, particularly when it 
became better able to justify to domestic constituencies and 
'allied Communist countries the aid extended to this regime. 
Politics; The Soviets' roost important political objective 
in the basin is to ferment and further forces and regimes 
which they consider progressive. Because the Soviets view 
the regime as the strategic rear or internal security zone 
of the US, their policy has been cautious, until recently 
respecting in action, if not in word, the Monroe Doctrine. 
This attitude changed in 1960 when Khrushchev stated that 
"the Monroe Doctrine has outlived its times" and that US 
acceptance of the Cuban Revolution was proof that it had 
43 died a "natural death•*. Still, because of certain 
41 For a more detailed discussion of the formulation of 
Soviet-Cuban strategy, see Jiri Vilenta, "The USSR, 
Cuba, and the Crisis in Central America", Orbis, 25(3), 
1981, pp.7;5-46. 
42 Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Soviet Strategy and 
Policies in the Caribbean Basin" in Howard J.Wiarda 
(edited) , Rift and Revolution, (Washington;American Enter-
prise Institute of Pxiblic Policy Research, 1984), p.204. 
43 TASS (Moscow), July 12,1960. For an elaboration of Soviet 
strategy, see M.F.Kudachin, The Great October and 
Commxanist parties of Latin America (Moscow ; Progress 
Pxjblishers, 1978)* 
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c o n s t r a i n t s , Sov ie t s t r a t e g y in the Caribbean during the 
pas t two decades has continued t o be re f ined and s u b t l e , 
al lowing for revolut ionary transformation by primari ly 
44 peaceful means. The choice of means i s d i c t a t e d by 
i n t e r n a l , nat ional cond±tions , which vary from country t o 
country, and by a number of external v a r i a b l e s , the most 
important among them being the s t a t e of Soviet-Annerican 
r e l a t i o n s . 
Soviet tactics in the area have vacillated from avidly 
pursuing peaceful diplomatic channels — vis-a-vis the 
late Omar Torrijos' militaiY yet "progressive" Panamanian 
regime and the likewise "progressive" regime of Michael 
Manley in Jamaica, for instance — to an emphasis on 
guarded but militant aspects of the revolutionary struggle — 
as in Nicaragua and Grenada. The Soviets also courted some 
liberal democratic regimes such as Mexico, Costa Rica, 
Colombia and Venezuela regimes while widening popular support 
45 for the radical leftist groups working in those countries. 
Security; One other important component of overall Soviet 
strategic vision regarding Central America and the Caribbean 
is oriented to security matters. The primary Soviet 
security objective is to gradually secure access to and 
maintain naval facilities in the Caribbean basin so as to 
improve the projection of Soviet power while undermining 
that of the US and its allies. A substantial Soviet military 
presence in the region would endanger logistic support for 
44 Refer to the Parliamentaty road to socialism - a pro-
longed political process during which anti-American 
forces build national coalitions to challenge US hegemony. 
45 Jiri and Virginia Valenta, n.42, p.206. 
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US allies in Europe and the delivery of oil and other 
strategic materials to the US. During wartime, Cuba* thou^ 
vulnerable itself, might serve as a forward base for 
submarines and aircraft carriers. 
Econqpaicst EconOTiic obJecti^Fes play a niaor role in Soviet 
strategy in Central America. Soviet trate investnant and 
credit^ in early 1982 were limited to Cuba* Mexico» Coa^ 
iaca« <3xeiiada and Nicaragua. Since they generally itto^ t J^f 
for in^rts in hard currend^i the Soviets probably di» np%. 
view the Caribbean as a priority interest in strictly 
economic terms. Thxis« in Central America/Soviet trade is 
47 low in both absolute and relative terms. The presence of 
vital natural resources in some countries — particularly 
in Mexico, Venezuela and elsewhere •>- has however spurred 
increasing interest in the basin. Soviet and Eastern Bloc 
trade and economic aid to 'client* regimes suc^ as Nicaragua 
and Grenada* not to mention Cuba, has consecjuently encouraged 
Soviet strategy in the area. 
Thus, in 1978, Havana mediated differences among the 
Seodinista factions and helped achieve a March 1979 reuni-
ficatioh# in which pro-Cuban leaders were found to dominate. 
AS the uprising became imminent, Cuba increased direct arms 
deliveries, organised and armed an 'internationalist brigade' 
to fight alongside the FSLN guerrillas besides sending 
military specialists to €he field. The spring of 1979 
saw Cuban military advisors from the Department of Special 
46 According to Soviet Air Force Lieutenant Viktor Belenko, 
who defected to the West in 1976, the Soviet* view the 
, island as their 'aircraft carrier* in the Caribbeen.See 
John Borrow, HLQ Pilot. (Mew York: Readers Digest Press, 
1980), p. 65 
47 Jiri and Virginia Valen^^, n.42, p.211, 
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Operations aceoopanying FSLH forces into battle while 
maintaining radio ooraaunications with Havana. And after 
the victory, key military advisory and intelligence 
positions were ^ awarded to Cubans. 
In tha wake of the revolution in Nicaragua, both Soviet 
backed Coomunist parties in Latin America and Soviet Latin 
Americanists began to progressively discard Khurushchev*s 
policy of 'peaceful transition to Socialism'; a policy 
that had been pursued with singular dedication in Latin 
America earlier 6n\» Morectver, Moscow called upon local 
CoBiBunists-to coordinate) %rith !^ie~V>aclous groups involved 
in the armed uprising. The tactics of Che Quevara, once 
referred to as 'ultra left adventurism' by Moscow in the 
1960s, were also gradually recognised as effective,, and 
rehabilitated. 
In those Central American countries where the United 
States has been the backer and the perceived beneficiary 
of the status quo, antl-Ame^canism, has often translated 
Itself Into pro-Sovietism. Nowhere is this more true than 
in Nicaragua, wfhere the US stapport foT Scmoza helps esqplain 
the original pro-Soviet bias of many Sandlnlsta commandants. 
A tieadln^  of t^ te founding documeatsi^ u Internal polemics, 
and private d^laratlons of ^ e tSUS dMnonstrates the 
Sandinistas* early IdepJtOgle^l leaning and commitment 
towards Soviet and Cuban style * socialism', Reacting 
against repeated American interventions in Nicaragua, many 
came to regard Moscow as their 'natural ally' and harboured 
enoxnous eaqpectations of Soviet economic and military 
support. In their view, concrete signs of fidelity were 
needed to assure such backening. Thus, in August 1979, the 
48 Robert S.Lelken and Barry Rubin (edited), n.4, p.32« 
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Sandlnlsta deleg^tioii sv^^ported 8oivlet-Cuban-VietnaB»«e 
.positions la tll« HttVftna A^ftting of the. Non-aligned countries, 
L«t9r, in ^ e UH in the face of ovetwheladng Third World 
ccMBfiflemnation qC Ruasian intervention in Af^ani8tan# the 
49 Micaraguaa delegation abstained. 
V 
By mid-1960« the new Sandinista government had signed 
ecooonic* scientific^ technical and cultural accords with 
the Soviet Union# Cuba/ Sast Oexnany* Bulgaria and CsecAo-
Slovakia. |iefore president Raag^ took office in January 
1981, the f«ikiliar Soviet bloc division of labour in the 
Third World vae emerging in Dicaraguaf^ The Ctibans provided 
doctorsr teadhers, construction workers^ military specialists# 
I ' ' j • 
intelligence bperatiyes ana advisors to t^ ie various govern-
ment ninistri^** Soviet^ concentitateji on state sacurity 
4long w t^h Cubans and East Germansy tlie Best Oerroans also 
aM^ated in intalligence and coinBUB)ication*i the Bulgarians 
haHtiiid finance, economic planning and eonstrudtion/ and the 
CpMi^ li pjDovided swne military advisora* 
Thus after an i n i t i a l cautious and guarded approach to* 
ni^ng cconltments to the ne«( regime, the Soviet Union 
punqped in ajd for various agricultural and industrial 
52 projects.'' Soviet deliveries of military equipment to 
Nicaragua also increased aubatantially since 1981, reaching 
49 . J^id. 
50 The evidenbe is typically partisan and partial, but 
fesoMr Sandinista Itaderi, defectors, diplomats in 
Managua, and dther Hourqsa dtmi a similar picture. 
51 Charles P. Andrain, Political Change in the Third 
World, (London x Allen'and Unwin, 1988), i^ .l32* See 
"Cuban Support for Central American Guerrilla 
Groups," CIA MemoraJQClum dated 2.5.79, pxablished in 
the Congressional Record for May 19, 1980. Also see 
Shirley Christian, n*31, pp. 159-61* 
52 For details, see Jiri and Virginia Valenta# n.42, p.217, 
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higher levels in 1984 as anti-Sandlnista rebels mounted a 
serious ^allenge to ^ the government. Moscow, now the world's 
fbrenost counterinsurgenqy power, »vtppliB» the overwhelming 
bulk of assistance to Nic^agua's military and security 
forces.^ 
Soviet authorities have frequently intimated to US 
diplomats that the "Nicaraguan problem" can be resolved only 
in the context, of US-Soviet relations. Sandinista eagerness 
for close ties with Moscow has permitted the Soviet union 
»to pursue a virtually cost-free policy. Nicaragua could he, 
and has been a bargaining chip in Moscow's preferred 
"political settlement" in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, US support 
for Nicaragiaan rebels diverted attention from Afghanistan, 
54 
and Moscow esqploited th# intervention for propaganda purposes. 
Moscow has been pursuing a wait-and-see, long-term 
strategy in Nicaragua. By 1986* Managua depended on Moscow 
for most of its oil axid on the Soviet bloc for most of its 
trade. Kremlin has encouraged the Sandinistas to diversify 
trading partners and aid donors. The Soviet-bloc presence in 
the intelligence, security, conmunications, and military 
fields has no doubt deepened, but Moscow provides only * enough 
aid to make US military intervention cost:ly and save the 
Soviet "revolutionary", reputation, not enough to deter a US 
55 invasion pr risk a superpower confrontation. The tragedy 
for Nicaragua is that, taken together^Washington*s legacy of 
interference, Moscow's cynicism, and Managua's imprudence 
have converted that tiny country into the newest arena of 
superpower contention. 
^ ^ — ^ • — • ^ " ^ ^ » ^ ^ " ^ — ' ^ ^ » — 
53 Robert S. Leiken and Barry Rtibin, n . 4 . p . 3 3 . 
54 I b i d . 
55 I b i d . . pp. 33-34 . 
CONCUTRTON 
It is esctremely difficult to view the Nicaragxaan 
revolution with anything approaching objectivity. So much 
depends upon the attitude of the obs<rver towards bourgeois 
democracy* towards socialism, towards dictatorship* and 
towards underdeveloped countries* While many visitors to 
Nicaragua have found the climate of the revolution exhila-
rating, others have been struck by the drabness of life and 
the grim puritanism of the revolution*s leaders. One 
therefore faces problons in grasping a situation so new and 
so fluid. * 
However* not even the enemies of the Sandinista govern-
ment could deny that it continued to have* at the beginning 
of 1981* a broad group of constituencies which could 
articulate thieir demand^ and who were* on the whole* satisfied 
with the allocation of values determined by the regime. One 
reason for this support was the burst of national patriotism* 
helped by an ideology and occasioned by a sanguinary 'civil 
war* against an unpopular regime* and tl^ ability of the 
Sandinistas to take upon themselves the mantle of leadership 
in that struggle. Thvi^ * the war created a disciplined 
military structure that could be put to partisan ends by 
the FSLM* and a general good will towards the party. Almost 
everyone wanted the new regime to .succeed* particularly as 
the US did i]iot seem too pleased with it. This general good 
1 Thomas P.Anderson, pqliti^ cs in Central America (New Yorkt 
Praeger* 4.982) * p.lMl 
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will may have faded somewhat, but it was by no means dead 
in 1981. 
The Sandinistas set up, after their victory, a series 
2 
of interlocking organisations of the masses. Since no 
rival conqprehensive structure existed among the opposition, 
these organisations played a vital role in maintaining the 
regime. It was through them that the Government received 
most of its inputs and feedback on .its decisions. They 
represented a broad and dynamic source of support, and 
continued to play that role for a good many years. 
The government's main prograinnes. Such as land reforms, 
the literacy canqpalgn, confiscation of Somocista estates 
and factories, and housing construction, all met with 
broad popular approval; though other measures, such as 
3 
control of sugar supply met with grumbling. The government 
of the FSLN was doing a great deal that was genuinely 
wanted and which had been necessary for some time. This, 
too, provided a substantial base of support. 
The powerful military establishment, being developed 
with Cuban and partial Soviet assistance also played its 
part in providing stability for the regime. The oft-
mentioned figure of 50,000 for the regular Sandinista armed 
forces sounded too high, in a country of less than 2.5 
4 
million people. But the growth of military power has 
indeed been sxibstantial. Vihen the military factor is 
2 Among these were the Sandinista union (CST), the 
peasant movement (ATC) , the youth movement (JS,-19) , 
the women's movement (AMNLAE), and most of all, the 
Sandinista Defence Committee, the CDS. 
3 See Shirley Christian, Nicaragua i Revolution in the 
Family, (New York : Random House, 1986), pp. 286-94. 
4 Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America, n.l, 
p. 187. ^ 
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added to the aforementioned ones, it becomes plain that the 
idea that the Sandinista government might magically go away 
is absurd. Barring a major economic catastrophe there 
appeared to be sufficient support to keep the FSLN in 
power for some time. 
> 
However, certain groups even from among the proletarian 
elements felt distinctly unhappy about many of the facets 
of life in the early eighties. One peasant group 
profoundly alienated was th|^  ethnic minority living along 
the Atlantic Coast. These non>Spanish speaking people 
regarded the government as an alien imposition. The 
locals also resented foreigners pairticularly the Cubans, 
who trere attCTipting to raise their political consciousness. 
These natives and the Sandinistas thus appeared to have 
entirely different sets of priorities. While the Sandinistas 
stood for military security and political control, the 
natives' priorities were communal rights and religion; 
6 things they considered non-negotiable. The non-Sandinlsta 
unions were also disgruntled, and this included the 65,000 
7 
member CTH, a force to reckon with. 
The upper business sector, the very wealthy who had 
been companions of the Somozas, had largely gone; but the 
middle business sector represented' by COSEP remained. 
Encouraged by Jose Francisco Cardenal, they had sketched 
out the bright promise of a 'pluralistic' Nicaragua. But 
soon their hopes were dashed and, as one of the keenest 
5 Ibid., p.185. 
6 For a detai led d iscussion of the Miski to-Sandinis ta 
relationship after the revolu t idn , see Shir ley Chr i s t i an , 
Nicaragua, n . 3 , pp. 295-309. 
7 Lat in America Regional Report. Central America and 
Mexico, 28 Novanber, 1980. 
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observers of the post-revolutionary situation confessed, 
"there is no place for these business men in the scheme 
of the new Hicaragua.** The state of affairs was viewed 
with some bitterness by the business consnunity. Sergio 
Ramirez and others said that middle class persons only 
belatedly supported the revolution* althou^ there were 
reasons to believe that thii^  was far from the truth. As 
Alfonso Robelo commented: **We were the anchor of the 
opposition to Somoza, without which the Sandinistas would 
not have had victories." 
In late 1980 the chief voice of the middle class was 
the newspaper La Prensa# which could hardly be called a 
latecomer to the opposition against Somoza; but this 
voice was saddled with all sorts of restrictions. Decrees 
511 and 512 prohibited any discussion of prices and 
inflation, clashes between government forces and the 
opposition, strikes and protest movements. According to 
Pedro Joaguin Chamorro Barrios, during negotiations over 
Ibanana prices conducted with Standard Fruit Company in San Francisco in December 1980 and.January 1981, the 
press was sent a warning letter telling it not to print 
anything on the subject, and then another warning, not to 
9 
print the first warning letter. La prgnsa# never without 
resources, countered by printing on its front page, for 
several days, a large photograph of a monkey eating a banana, 
a vivid reminder, to all its readers, of the news which 
they knew could not be printed. Of the other newspapers, 
Barricada was- busy trying to turn itself into a banana-
repxiblic version of the Pravda, while. El Nuevo Diario was 
8 Thomas p. Anderson, Politics in Central America, n.l, 
p. 185. • — — 
9 The above mentioned decrees provided for fines and 
imprisonment for violation by editors. 
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hardly less sycophantic. That all three were edited by 
members of the same family was perhaps the ultimate irony. 
One iinportant groiip which enjoyed an anflslvalent rela-
tionship with the government was the Catholic church. The 
f Church, like OOSEP and La pr^nsa^ had played a very large 
^role in the overthrow of Somoza. Archbishop Miguel Obando 
Y. Bravo was the very source of the opposition but the 
other religious orders, particularly the Capuchins, were 
not far behind. Further, there were, at the end of 1980, 
no less than "four ^ ciests holding cabinet-level posts in 
'^the government? ^n the pastoral letter of November 1979. 
the bishops of Nicaragua had appeared basically favourable 
..to the revolution, and even to socialism, as they understood 
it. Having proposed several unorthodox definitions of 
socialism, they had gone on to declare: "If socialism 
signifies, as it should, th^ preeminence of the interests 
of the majority of the Nicaraguanpeople and a model of 
national economic planning, solidarity and progressive 
12 participation, we have no objections to it," Follcjwing 
the total lack of response to the call by the FSLN for 
priests to get out of the government since there were 
qualified lay personnel to replace them, the bishops adopted 
a harder line. The pastoral letter of October 1980 
reflected increasing fears of Marxist dictatorship and 
denounced the "Materialism" of the Sandinista philosophy. 
It went on to charge the priests who remained members of 
the government with a scandalous disregard of the teachings 
of the Pope,John Paul II — which could hardly be denied — and 
10 Thomas p. Anderson, n.l, p.l85. 
11 For an tinderstanding of the post~1979 church-FSLN relation-
ship, see ^ lirley cairistian. n.3. pp. 236-72. 




warned of the dapgers of a totalitarian state. Everyone 
knew that this represented the thinking of the majority of 
the bishops, with Rtiben Lopez being perhaps the outstanding 
dissident; and that it represented, above all, the feelings 
of the powerful archbishop of Managua himself, the man who 
had done so much to bring down Somoza. With that message, 
the church had become a formidable ant^agonist of the 
state once more. 
There were threats from other quarters as well. Although 
small* radical groups such as the Trotskyites existed, the 
pressure exerted by them was negligible. There was, however« 
substantial danger of subversion and military action by 
forces to the rigiht. These forces were rendered relatively 
harmless by their disunity and disorganisation. The leader 
of the exile community Urcuyo Malenor proclaimed in 
Guatemala that he had founded a government in exile, but 
the Guatemalan government forbade him to launch any 
14 
activities there, under penalty of deportation. The, other 
major contender for leadership of this group, since the 
death of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was his son Anastasio 
Somoza Portocarrero, a resident of Miami. The extensive 
Florida exile community appeared to look to him for leader-
ship, but "El Chiguin" — the kid, as Tachito was called — 
showed little of the drive of his two •illustrious' 
ancestors. 
More important than ghostly governments in exile were 
the armed movements. One of these was made up entirely 
13 This Week Central America and Panama, 3 November, 
1980. 
14 Thomas P.Anderson, Politics in Central America, n.l, 
p.189. 
15 Debayle was assassinated in Paraguay on September 17, 
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of o ld Scjmoclstas, c h i e f l y former National Guard members, 
and was headed by Oscar Armando Larios . L a r i o s ' s group* 
the Fuerzas Armadas Democraticas, was powerful, w e l l 
armed and teamed up with organisa t ions such as the Popular 
Anti-Communist M i l i t i a , c o n s i s t i n g of former Somocistas . 
Then there was an organisat ion headed by Jose Fraiicisco 
Cardenal, cousin of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro and who became 
Vice-Pres ident of the Council of State in May 1980, only 
to l eave the country soon a f t e r , deaouncing the regime as 
"Communist**. His Union Democratica Nicaraguense was 
coD^osed mostly of d i s i l l u s i o n e d supporters of the revo lu-
t ion such as Edmundo Chamorro, who made the famous rocket 
attack on La Loma from the I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l Hotel in 197a, 
and Comroandante Fabian, an ex-FSIM g u e r r i l l a leader who 
17 
operated, with a band, from Honduras. Hen of t h i s s o r t 
could hardly be dismissed as radica l r i g h t i s t s and t h e i r 
oppos i t ion had a propaganda e f f e c t far beyond t h e i r armed 
s t r e n g t h . The Sandinista government apparently had s u f f i -
c i e n t s trength to weather a l l the a t tacks and sabotaging 
by these groups a t the beginning of 1981. The danger was 
that they might persuade Honduras and Guatemala t o launch 
an at tack alongwith them, p o s s i b l y supported cover t ly by 
18 the United S t a t e s . While t h i s scenar io seemed u n l i k e l y , 
i t was regarded with great ser iousness in Nicaragua. Another 
source of p o t e n t i a l oppos i t ion was formed in July 1981, when 
the c h i e f ot the M i l i t i a Popular Sandin is ta (MPS) — an 
adjunct of the regular Sandin i s ta Popular Army — Eden 
Pastora , and v i c e Minis ter of the I n t e r i o r , Jose Valdiv ia 
16 I Armando's brother, now serv ing a sentence for t reason , 
I was the f i r s t defence m i n i s t e r of the Sandinista govern-
' ment. 
17 This Week Central America and Panama. 26 January, 1981. 
18 Thomas P.Anderson, n . l , p .188 . 
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suddenly quit their posts and left Nicaragua. Rumour had 
it that they had quarrelled with Borge and Humberto Ortega 
over Cuban and Soviet influence in the country. 
In other words, it took few months for the tensions 
over the future course of Nicaragua to erupt into public 
discord and end the honeymoon between the FSLN and the 
great majority of non-Marxists who had remained in the 
country. Earlier, during a three day period in April 1980, 
Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro resigned from the Junta, 
and La Prensa was closed by an internal dispute over the 
attitude the newspaper should take towards the policies 
19 imposed by the FSLN, The immediate issue for Robelo was 
the Sandinistas* effort to expand the size of the Council 
of State then being formed and give themselves a clear 
majority. Violeta Chamorro diplometically cited a lame leg 
as her reason for resigning three days before Robelo, but 
she had joined him in opposing the expansion and reappoint-
20 
ment of the Council of State. por both, the issues went 
deeper and wider. 
Others like Jorge Salazar were in favour of holding 
elections; he had come to view elections as the pivotal 
issue in whether Nicaragua would go a totalitarian route or 
21 
accommodate itself to some form of Western democracy. But 
H\]inberto Ortega's speech ma^e on the occasion of the ceremonial 
19 In August 1980, Humberto Ortega announced, that there 
were to be no campaigning in the press and that neither 
shortages nor security matters, such as disturbances, 
could be mentioned in the press. Ibid. 
20 Shirley Christian, n.3, p.171. 
21 Salazar was a private farm and business leader and 
president of the Union of Nicaraguan Agricultural 
producers (UPANIC). 
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closing of the Literary Crusade made it clear that there 
could be DO elections until 1985, so political canpaigning 
until 1984, and implying that elections, when they came, 
would be different from those usually seen in western 
nations. To Salazar, the FSLN had reneged on its May 
1979 promise of holding elections and thus "shown its 
22 
colours as Marxist-Leninist." He then began to meet 
various opponents of Sandinista policies who had gradually 
moved out of the country and spoke in terms of a ""fight for 
the liberation of Nicaragua." The crack was showing. 
Salazar's killiogyallegedly at the hands of Sandinista 
agents and Tomas Borge's calling him "a traitor plotting 
to over throw the regime" was the final straw. Not only did 
this isolate the business community from the FSLN but 
also hardened lines between the Sandinista Front and the 
opposition. It also changed the rules of the game — the 
conciliatory approach gave way to one of confrontation,of 
23 defiance. Those who thought as he did,continued to 
insist that ^ey had a right to remain ita Nicaragua and a 
right to influence the political and economic future of the 
country. 
The FSLN Government a l s o s t i r r e d up trouble for i t s e l f 
by adopting a pro-Sov ie t l i n e in regard to the world beyond 
the Americas as w e l l as w i t h i n . To many ' n a t i o n a l i s t s ' 
who had fought against Somoza, Yankee iiriperialism came 
t o be replaced by Soviet and Cuban imperialism — only 
tha t , for them, the l a t t e r was worse. Despite FSLN claims 
to the contrary, the presence of Sov ie t advisors hardly 
22 Quoted in Sh ir ley Chr i s t i an , n . 3 , p . 199. 
23 I b i d . , p . 214. 
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changed things for the cornnon man. Besides, there was 
intense resentment among the deeply religious Nicaraguan 
24 people because of anti-Christian tirades of the Ci±)ans. 
Elsewhere, the decision of the Nicaraguan represen-
tative in the UN to abstain on the Afghanistan issue and the 
maintaining of relations with Taiwan at the expense of 
China, lost the Front a number of supporters. This erratic 
and bellicose nature of Nicaraguan foreign policy projected 
itself in relations with other countries as well. Not 
only did tensions with Honduras continue, but Nicaragua 
managed to alienate many of the countries which had 
supported the FSLN against Somoza. A dispute with Colombia 
over the San Andres and providencia Islands was followed by 
25 
cooling of relations with Manama. Also the FSLN's 
decision to help materially and morally the guerrillas 
fighting the government in El Salvador under its principle 
of "revolutionary internationalism** not only made 'neutral' 
governments to st«nd vip and take notice but also finally 
led the US to review its policy of giving aid to Nicaragua; 
a step which was to have profound ramifications for the 
26 
country already steeped in poverty and chaos. 
The Sandinista Government thus found itself in the 
xinenviable position of being supported only by the 
ideologically left group within the country. While some 
non-Marxists like Omar Cabezas and Violeta Chamorro stayed 
back, others went into exile, ostensibly to start yet 
another liberation war. Jorge Salazar had sought to make 
24 See Thomas P. Anderson, n.l, p.178, 
25 Ibid. 
26 Particularly the Parabundo Marti National Libera-
tion Front. 
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a beginning in this regard b\»t was killed before he could 
do much. The mantle thus fell on people like Jose Francisco 
Cardenal« Enrique Bermudez and Edmundo Chamorro. Organisa-
tions like ADRIN and UDN — whose iqotto was Sin Conmunismo* 
Sin Somocismo (without Conmunidm or Somocism) — began to 
27 
raise money to arm the exilds. Gradually* guerrilla 
attacks on FSUi cadres and government posts in the far-
flung areas began. In fact, by July 1982, the insurgents 
were presenting a serious challenge to the Sandinista 
army and militiamen in the border area and launching small 
strikes deep into Jinotega. The insurgency had begun. 
Thanks to headline writers, the insurgency soon had a 
special name: La Contra — short for counter-revolution in 
Spanish. Though many of the anti-Sandinistas, including 
Jose Cardenal, denied being counter revolutionaries, the 
name was adopted almost universally both by the people who 
supported the Sandinistas and those who hated them. "It 
was a short handy term reflecting the institutional status 
28 that the Contra acquired^" Fed b^ ' Sandinista policies 
and American doliars, the Contra could only grow. 
Two basic objectionsi were raised to the Contra, even 
by many Americans and foreign critics of the Sandinistas. 
One questioned the morality of the decision of the United 
States to provide funds as also advise a paramilitary 
force, mine harbours and sanction — in a Contra training 
manual — the assassination of rural Sandinista officials. 
The second objection held that the Contras accomplished 
nothing except to. contribute to death and destruction, 
including the killing of non-combatants, and that they gave 
27 ADRIN stood for Nicaraguan Democratic Revolutionary 
Alliance and UDN, for Nicaraguan Democratic Union. 
28 Shirley Christian, n.3, p.235. 
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the Sandinistas reason to institute repressive policies. 
Had there oeen no Contras, it is said, the Sandinistas 
might have had no jxistification to stock-pile food, to 
institute the military draft, and to pressurize people 
to Join the militia. 
Despite Contra pressure, Daniel Ortega was elected 
president of Nicaragua on November 4, 1984. For the 
FSxiN, elections meant "we Were going to have the legitimacy 
29 that the government of the US has been trying to deny us." 
Nicaraguans voted amidst claims from the Sandinistas that 
the US was preparing to invade the country. The Sandinistas 
hoped to deflect the pressure arising out of US cut-off of 
concessionary wheat sales, troop maneouvres in Honduras 
and overflights by spy planes. The western press spoke of 
rigging and other measures intended to cripple the opposition 
during the elections. But these allegations generally 
smacked of a pro-American bias and remained uncorroborated. 
The nation of which Daniel Ortega became president 
could hardly feed itself. There were chronic shortages of 
nearly everything, even the most basic food items normally 
produced in abundance inside Nicaragua. One of the generally 
accepted explanations for basic food shortages was the FSI^ 
was stockpiling to feed the military incase of a larger war. 
This view was substantiated when large quantities of a few 
basic items suddenly appeared on supermarket shelves Just 
29 Sergio Ramirez, quoted in Shirley Christian, n.3, p.346. 
30 Among other things mentioned wtsre: The FSLN control 
over the election machinery, the electoral law in 
force in 1984 formulated by the FSLN — majority Council 
of State and the use of coercion by various Sandinista 
Committees, particularly the Sandinista Defence 
Committees. Ibid. 
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before the elections at decontrolled prices. The FSLN 
correctly claimed that it had eradicated several diseases 
in the country with vaccination campaigns but medicines 
for most illnesses were no longer to be found in the country. 
The goverqroent had stopped paying the interest on most of 
$3.8 million foreign debt, an amount that on a per capita 
basis put Nicaragua in the company of the most indebted 
nations of the world. Besides« the oil crisis resulting 
from the stoppage of supply by Mexico and Venezuela was 
further aggravated by Contra attacks on the country's only 
oil port.^^ All this coi 
on the Sandinista Front. 
., 31 
 ombined-put. a tremendous pressure 
Around the same time, however. Congressional restrictions 
were placed on the funding of the Contra by the CI A*. In 
May 1984, the Congress voted to totally cut off CIA financial 
assistance to the Contra. This development made the Contra 
leaders scramble to find help from what they said were 
interested individuals and government-related groups outside 
the US. Congress, however, stipulated that aid could be 
resumed only upon enactment of a Joint Resolution of 
Congress. 
In mid-1985. Congress voted to resume aid to the 
Nicaraguan rebels but limited it to "humanitarian" or non-
lethal uses. This meant it could be used to pay for food, 
medical care, clothing and transport. Washington's decision 
32 
was apparently influenced by two developments. One, it was 
impressed by the growth and apparent appeal of the armed 
opposition; it concluded that the Contra had become a force 
31 Ibid., p.351. 
32 Ibid., p.368. 
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that would not just go away, that had to be dealt with as 
a major phenomenon on the scene. Two, Ortega had offended 
many members of the Congress by travelling to Moscow just 
33 days after Congress voted down lethal aid in April 1965. 
These reasons were viewed by many even inside America as 
justifications for a step Reagan had already decided on 
taking and as a means of covert supply of arms to the 
Contras. , 
Among those who debated and analysed US Central American 
policy, it was often argued that a negotiated settlement was 
possible between the US and the FSLN. Such a settlement 
would involve an exchange: The Sandinistas' retention of 
power in exchange for an end to their assisting of Marxist 
guerrilla groups elsewhere. However, the likely price to 
34 the US for such an agreement was the end of the Contra. 
That, in turn would have amounted to consolidation of the 
Sandinista regime internally, and tacit US approval of 
policies that would never lead to the political pluralism 
that was the goal of the Americans. And in this, what the 
Nicaraguan masses felt was relegated to the background. The 
US maintained — although it may well be contested — that 
this would have been a peace without real solution; one that 
would leave unresolved most of the outstanding issues. 
33 Congress approved the new aid only after President 
Reagan made a written commitment to negotiations, towards 
. which many members of Congress hoped that the rebel force 
might provide leverage on the Sandinistas, and to work-
ing for an improved human rights performance by the 
rebels. Ibid. • 
34 This was a version of the proposal that the former 
Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas O.Enders, had put 
to the FSLN in August 1981, The way the argument went, 
in early 1986, was that the Sandinistas, after years of 
guerrilla warfare, might be more inclined to satisfy the 
security concerns of the US. Thomas P.Anderson, n.l, 
p. 189. 
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This matter of internal political pluralism and the 
extent to which the US should intervene to bring it about 
is the question US foreign policy foimulators have not 
addressed themselves to. Intervention refers not only to 
direct military action but also to broader attempts to 
influence the internal politics of a country through all the 
methods at the command. Should the US threaten to invade 
Nicaragua because of its Acquiring modem arms or can the US 
justify intervention or other forms of pressure in the 
interests of internal change? Even if the tactics in 
(question did not include invasion« could they be justified? 
Much of the confusion about ^\Ate goals and function of the 
Contra was linked to this debate.^^ 
In fact, the White House seldom, almost never, cited 
the internal policies of the FSLN as reason for its support 
of the Contra. Instead, it invented other reasons for 
36 training and financing the Contra, it publicly claimed 
that Contra forces existed to interrupt arms supplies from 
Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador; though CIA officials 
dlowed Contra militants to think that they were fighting to 
37 
rescue their own country. One ^ ethical question about US 
role in creating the Contra was whether the US should have 
manipulated people who sought for their country the things 
the US had initially not encouraged them to seek in opposing 
Somoza* a chance to test political pluralism as a means of 
address ing^  its problems. 
35 Shirley Christian, n.3, p,377» 
36 Ibid. 
37 While the evidence of logistical and advisory connec-
tions between the FSLN and the Salvadoran guerrillas 
was strong, including the presence in Managua of the 
latter* s high command, relatively few actual aims, 
shipments were captured by Honduran or Costa Rican 
authorities, not the Nicaraguan rebels. 
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It was thus never fully clear» whether the real purpose 
of the Contra# In the mind of the Reagan administration# 
was to bring down the Sandinistas (or force a major struc-
tural change in the regime) or simply to put a piece in the 
gameboard that could be taken off to gain something else, 
such as concessions on the Salvadoran guerrilla question or 
the departure of Nicaragua's Soviet bloc advisers. 
A proposed Central American peace treaty, known as 
Contadora for the Panamanian island where the drafting 
began in January 1983, attempted to deal with all of the 
Central American issues by committing the signatory nations 
to Internal democratisation as well as reductions in arma-
ments and the departure of foreign military advisors. While 
initially the FSLN indicated its willingness to sign the 
first draft of the treaty produced in mid-1984, it later 
withdrew, saying that the real dispute was between Nicaragua 
and the US and not among the Central American nations and 
could thus be resolved on a bilateral basis. The US continued 
to insist that it would not open bilateral talks with 
Nicaragua until the Sandinistas opened a "dialogue" with 
representatives of the armed rebels and other opposition 
groups. 
At the end of 1985, the Contadora effort looked dead, 
but in early 1986, the four countries that had undertaken 
to sponsor the treaty drafting, Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia 
and Panama/ made an effort to revive it. Both the Sandi-
nistas and the US expressed support. Still, the main stick-
ing point, the argument over political principle, remained. 
It was not over guns, really, but over politics. The 
Sandinistas, on the one side, and, on the other, the four 
other Central American governments, along with the Nicaraguan 
rebels and the United States held diametrically opposite 
106 
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views on the kinds of political systems that were desirable. 
Vniile there were some differences between and among the 
four other Central American countries and the US over 
approaches to the issue« there was general agreement that 
the major problems of the region were linked to the 
existence of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. However* 
not mxich came out'this attempt at reconciliation and there 
was an inevitable stalemate. 
In the meantime, US policy was Inflicting great pain on 
the Nicaraguan masses. Since 1985; Vfashington had strangled 
Nicaraguan trade with an embargo. It had also managed to 
cut off Nicaragua's credit at the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. Consequently* real urban wages in 
Nicaragua fell to about one tenth of what they were before 
the revolution. Farm workers made as little as 30 cents 
a day. 
The Amez^ ican funding of the Contra and the latter's 
sabotage of government installations could only add to the 
misery. The disclosures made about private funding of the 
Contras through diversion of Iran Arms sales profits in 1986 
lent credibility to the belief that the US would leave no 
40 
stone unturned to ensure Oxrtega's overthrow. 
38 It came down to a dispute over whether it was possible 
to find accomnodation between those who believed in 
a basically Leninist government structure and those 
trying to create, in some cases with great difficulty, 
basically liberal systems. 
39 Newsweek, February 26, 1990, p.34. 
40 Washington pursued what has been called an arm's length 
policy: Wreck the economy and prosecute a long and 
costly civil war until the ea^ hausted Nicaraguans would 
overthrow the unwanted government themselves. ' See Time, 
March 12, 1990, p.41. 
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Nicaragua was in early 1989 forced with a 40 % drop in 
GtXP, an inflation rate running at 1,700 per cent a year 
(which cliinbed up to an incredible 36,000 per cent in 1988) 
41 
and constant shortagesof food and basic necessities. The 
Soviet Union had not withdrawn its $ 300 million annual 
stibsidy but the Sandinistas could see that Moscow was 
retrenching both financially and politically. By February 
1989, when Central American leaders under Costa Rican 
President Oscar Arias Sanchez met in El Salvador to 
discuss a peace plan, the Sandinistas badly needed relief. 
Ortega quickly persuaded hia^  peers to conclude a dramatic 
dealt the Contra would be disbanded in exchange for free 
elections. The first step towards vindication of American 
policy in Nicaragua had thus been taken. 
The victory of the Violeta Chamorro-led and US-funded 
National Opposition Union (U.N.O.) in the February 1990 
elections and the subsequent smooth transfer of power to 
the new rulers shows portents of a reconsolidation of US 
influence over Nicaragua. How well they manage it remains 
to be seen. Already, the dicision of Chamorro to retain 
Humberto Ortega as chief of the army has caused considerable 
consternation in the White House. The Contra is to disband 
by June 1990 but Chamorro has to use all resources at her 
command to manage what appears to be a tight ropewalk, 
keeping in.mind the factions withiH the UNO and a powerful, 
left-oriented military under the influence of the Sandi-
nistas. 
The wheel has moved one full circle. The Sandinistas 
had meant well, in the sense that they sought to carry out, 
41 Time, March 12, 1990, p.41. Also see Newsweek, February 
757"1990, p.34. 
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42 in a span of a decade, reforms and' recons truc t ion . That 
they f a i l e d t o conso l ida te was the r e s u l t of the in terp lay 
of a nvunber of extraneous f o r c e s . E l e c t i o n r e s u l t s cannot 
however be considered a r e j e c t i o n of a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t 
t r a d i t i o n s of the Nicaraguans. AS Daniel Ortega proclaimed 
in h i s p o s t - e l e c t i o n speech; "The change of government by 
43 
no means s i g n i f i e s the end of the r e v o l u t i o n . " Whether 
or not the FSLN proves r e s i l i e n t enough to absorb the 
present shock and grow in s trength to be able t o present 
an alternative to chamorro, time only can t e l l . 
42 The PSLN's land xreforms ensured that thousands of 
Campesinos (peasants) ^ot land. In 1978, there were 
2,000 f a m i l i e s which owned 42 per cent o f the arable 
land. After the reforms in 1989 b ig landlords owned 
only nine per cent of the arable land; 1,20,000 f a m i l i e s 
b e n e f i t t e d from the handing over of almost 4 .9 m i l l i o n 
acres of land to them. See p e o p l e ' s Democracy, New 
De lh i , March 11 , 1990, p . 8 . 
43 Quoted in People' Democracy, New De lh i , March 11 , 1990, 
p . 1 1 . 
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